A/38/PV.66 General Assembly

The pecples of the world cannot have forgotten how the Soviet social- imperialists, after their invasion ofCzechoslovakia, tried by hook or by crook to erase their aggressor's image from their minds. The two super-Powers, having exerted joint efforts concerning the holding of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which ended with the signing with great pomp, at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, of the Final Act, boasted of their contribution to, and merit regarding this entire affair. 43. The Soviet social-imperialists needed the Helsinki Final Act also as a fig-leaf to cover up their shameful deed. But not many years had elapsed since the Helsinki Conference-where they had washed their blood-stained hands by solemnly "pledging" that they would strive for international peace and security-beforethe world learned that once again the Soviet social-imperialists had bar- barously attacked and invaded another country, this time Afghanistan, with their tanks and war-planes. This savage aggression committed against a small neighbouring coun- try was an open manifestation ofthe pronounced military character oftheir policy, which relies on the use of force for attaining expansionist ambitions. It was also a crime against freedom-loving peoples and against international peace and security. With this act, the social-imperialist Soviet Union has shown that; just like United States imperialism, it constitutes today a serious danger and threat/ to the freedom and independence of peoples throughout the world. probl~m in conformity with the relevant General Assem- bly resolutions. 54. Egypt has been a staunch supporter of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially those concerning respect for the freedom, independence and sovereignty of peoples and States, non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs ofother countries, and the right of peoples to self-determination. Egypt has underlined its position by upholding the various United Nations resolutions on the problem of Afghanistan and by supporting the decisions adopted by the Seventh Con- ference of Heads ofState or Government ofNon-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, which set forth the position of the non-aligned countries on this problem [seeA/38/132and CO".1 and2. annex. sect. 1, paras. 114 and 1IS). SS. Today, Egypt reaffIrms its fIrm solidarity with the fraternal people ofAfghanistan in their legitimate strug- gle to recover their inalienable rights. Egypt will continue to pursue its peaceful efforts ~use of its profound wnviction that resort to force to resolve international problems will result only in their further exacerbation. 56. The claim that the problem of Afghanistan is an internal one with which the United Nations should not "The resistance which had begun during Daoud's time had started assuming a clearly Islamic character during Taraki's time. There was a serious possibility that the Communist regime would collapse and be replaced . . . possibly by an Islamic and pro-Pakistan and pro-China regime, . . . Except for Hezbe Islami and Jamiate Islami, all other groups were formed in 1978. The origins of the Hezbe Islami and Jamiate Islami groups can be traced back to Zahir Shah's time ... After Daoud's coup d'etatin 1973, the lead- ers of Hezbe Islami and Jamiate Islami migrated to Pakistan ... The Gulbuddin group-that is, Hezbe Islami-"opted for armed resistance and sought help from Pakistan against Daoud's Government." The same publication has put the number of armed men under this group anywhere between 30,000 and 67,000. 106. Selig Harrison, a senior associate of the Camegie Endowment and a renowned scholar in South-West Asian affairs, in an article entitled "A Breakthrough in Afghan- istan?", published in the summer 1983 issue of Foreign Policy magazine, writes in this connection: 117. As early as May 1978-1 repeat that date, May 1978-the tide of armed provocation and subversion began to be felt and a lengthy chain of bases for the training of counter-revolutionaries sprang up around some major cities and towns along the border area. 113. In June 1978, a so-called symposium of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] high command was convened in Annapolis, Maryland, United States, to dis- cuss the revolution in Afghanistan and "its repercussions for America". A decision was taken to fully support the counter-revolutionary forces. The CIA was entrusted with the task of organizing, arming, equipping and training Afghan counter-revolutionaries. 119. In the implementation of this task, thorough co- ordination prevailed between the CIA and the Pakistan Central Intelligence Division [CID]. The entire operation was kept highly secret and was later revised at a meeting between Joseph Reagan, Chief of the CIA operatives in Islamabad, and Radhor Alam, head ofthe Pakistan CID in June 1979. 120. After the adoption of the new plan, Reagan and his Deputy, Robert Lissard, an old CIA hand disguised as a diplomat, who was expelled from Afghanistan in 1974 for his espionage activities, held meetings with Pakistani army generals who were later appointed as commanders of the Pakistani frontier forces. Counter- revolutionary formations were set up; offices were estab- lished throughout Pakistan and in the capitals of some other countries; special journals and periodicals started publication; radio transmitters were commissioned and training-camps mushroomed in the border areas; fund- raising campaigns were launched inside Pakistan, through- out the Gulf region and in western capitals; organized mercenary recruitment started; and in the meantime, the first batches of armed terrorists were infiltrated across the frontier areas into Afghan villages, terrorizing the civilian population and forcing it to abandon its homes in search of security in areas removed from subversive operations. 121. The intelligence services of imperialism and their counterparts in the region pursued the tactic of forcing more and more civilians into exile in order to expand the source ofmercenary recruitment. To accomplish this task, the spreading of false rumors about the nature of the revolutionary government and the creation of an atmos- phere of fear and honor were resorted to. After having been uprooted from their homes and hearths, these dis- placed Afghans found themselves in a desperate situation of total dependency beyond Afghanistan's frontiers. 122. The counter-revolutionary groups, through a net- work established with the direct consent and assistance of the Pakistanis, enlisted all newcomers as members of their counter-revolutionary organizations and, only after that, registered them as refugees. This process was con- firmed by many of the Afghans who have returned to their homes. 12~. A study prepared by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, entitled Sustaining Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, notes in this connection that "a number of politico-religious mujahidin parties 125. In order to preserve and consolidate the privileged position of those exploitative strata, the government of Pakistan maintained the feudal and pre-feudal relation- ship within the fugitives' camps. 126. The United Nations Research Institute foi' Social Development writes in this connection in the afon~men­ tioned study: "The traditional social structures ofthe tribal village appeared to be applied in the village settings. "The leaders of former hamlets and tribal com- munities in Afghanistan were instrumental in the instal- lation process. "The maliks"-or chieftains-"would provide the link between the Pakistani village administration and the refugee communities. "Responsibility for various assistance measures, both food and non-food, was handed over to the refugee community leaders . . . "A political consciousness was well-developed and perhaps constantly nourished by the refugee leaders. A certain degree of manoeuvring for power seemed to be evolving within a situation of dependency on relief and a social structure with plenty of room for manipu- lative proficiency. " . . . the mujahidin parties took charge of the sustenance of the refugee populations, with the Gov- ernment of Pakistan and aid agencies providing the relief commodities. Informal grace-for-favour prin- ciples were probable, relief possibly having been dis- tributed in return for such support as joining one of the parties." 127. UNHCR in Islamabad, in its year-end report on its activities iil Pakistan in 1981, writes that as the influx of refugees evolved, the mujahidin parties consolidated their positions in Pakistan regarding both the provincial authorities and the refugees. The government authorities appear to have co-operated with them in order to identify and register the refugees. Voluntary aid agencies also seem to have given assistance to the refugees through this channel. Over time, the mujahidin parties appear on the whole to have successfully enrolled the leaders of the refugee communities in their ranks, and these leaders were gradually able in turn to enlist the rank and file of rural refugees. 128. Selig Harrison, in his article "A Breakthrough in Afghanistan_1", mentioned above, writes: "Until now, the Pakistan Government has permitted the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan to be the dominant influence in the refugee camps. This has included uninhibited use ofa widely feared Jamaat organization known as Sakhar, which combines paramilitary and intelligence functions. Jamaat agents have regularly accompanied the Pakistani officials who dispense rations and monthly stipends to the refugees. As a result of this policy, the number of refugees officially registered as members of the fundamentaIist groups has st~adily grown . . . " 129~ I As can be,seen from this evidence, the Govern- ment of Pakistan played an important role-I should say " . . . fright and worry . . . over absent husbands or sons (especially the ones who left periodically for Afghanistan) were reportedly overwhelming problems which were created in the refugee situation. "Able-bodied men reportedly ... leave periodically for their home country . . . "Many apparently spend months away . . . without leaving word as to when they expect to be back. "Consequently there was a noticeable lack of younger men in the villages . . . " . . . the relations with the village staff were some- what half-hearted ... A team of security guards was assigned to the refugee village administrators . . . In some villages the relationship between the staff and the refugees seemed literally to be one ofarmed neutrality." 132. And thus the more people were forced into exile, the more expanded became the counter-revolutionary activities. Sporadic attacks on small villages along the frontier areas gave place to organized sabotage missions iust in the towns and cities close to the frontier and later in the provinces of Afghanistan. 133. The first in the series of armed attacks occurred in Noristo.m by the gangs garrisoned in Chetral; it was followed by subversive activities in Kunar and Nangahar provinces. It should be pointed out that until these attacks which emanated from Pakistan territories, no armed incident had taken place against the revolution within the country. 134. Apart from the equipment which was initially assigned to combat Zionist expansionism and to defend the Arab nations, some other types ofarmaments appeared in terroristic actions in Afghanistan that were completely extraneous to the region. This was obviousiy an attempt on the part of imperialist secret services to make it dif- ficult to trace the origins of the arms and equipment and to hide "'heir criminal involvement in the undeclared war.. But it did not take long for the international community to learn from the highest authorities of those countries who purchased or sold those weapons to be destined for the counter-revolutionaries' garrisons in Pakistan. 135. Let us refer to some first-hand reports on the whole operation in the hope that it may clarify the situation a little further. 136. On 13 January 1979, for example, the Indian Newspaper Patriot disclosed that: . "A special CIA operative has been set up in the American Embassy in Islamabad and the American Consulate General in Karachi under the overall com- mand of Robert Lissard. The Lissard task force has been given the task of organizing extremely secret and sensitive operations both in Iran and Afghanistan. The recent spurt of counter-revolutionary activities on the "Sinkian~ province in China ... has a number of secret schools of guerrilla training. These centr~ are for training such pro-Chinese groups as Sholey loved of Afghanistan." 143. A report published in the Canadian magazine Maclean's about the activities of Chinese speCialists on Pakistani territory deserves attention. In particular, it described how American agents, in their bid to halt the spread of narcotics, met a group of Chinese near the Afghan frontier. A suspicion arose at iust thatthese were Chinese from Hong Kong who were heroin traffickers dealing with purchases of opium poppies. However, it was established later that they were in fact officers and instructors in the Chinese army. The journal stated.: "They were here to help train and equip right-wing Afghan guerrillas for their holy war against the Moscow- backed [Government) of Noor Mohammed Taraki." Times correspondent William Borders wrote in a dispatch from Peshawar that: "Mr. Gailani and others operate with relative impu- nity on Pakistan territory ... and [they are] flying from Pakistan to other parts ofthe world in their cam- paign for international support • . . Although the rebels will not concede it publicly, it is also widely believed that they get some of their arms here, either from Pakistani sources or from Middle Eastern con- tacts who ship them through Pakistan into Afghani- stan across a mountainous border that is untamed, unpatrolled and largely unrecognized by the people who live alongit." 146. We could go on quoting many more sources which reported on the anti-Afghan armed intervention before 27 December 1979, but we would rather limit ourselves to the ones already cited. All facts available to the inter- national community clearly point to the existence of an undeclared war against Afghanistan, which began shortly after the victory of our revolution of 27 April 1978, and to the manner in which it was master-minded and put into action. 147. Allow me to examine the question of whether or not this undeclared war constitutes an act of armed attack and aggression. 148. During the past few years, great efforts have been made to cover up the intensity and severity of the unde- clared war which was launched after th~ April 1978 revolution and which assumed a critical level in the months preceding the internal developments of27 Decem- ber 1979. This was being done in order to disqualify the undeclared war from being considered as an act of aggression. 149. On 14 December 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3314 (XXIX) containing the Def- inition of Aggression. According to article 3 of that Definition: "Any of the following acts, regardless of a declara- tion of war, . . . qualify as an act of aggression: " "(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State . . . " 150. As far back as 21 December 1965, the General Assembly, in resolution 2131 (XX), adopted the Declara- tion on the Inadmissibility ofIntervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independ- ence and Sovereignty. In paragraph 2 ofthat Declaration it is stated that "no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violeutoverthrow of the regime of another State . . . ". 151,. In its Declaration on the Strengthening of Inter- national Security, adopted on 16 December 1970 in reso- lution 2734 (XXV), the General Assembly, in paragraph 5 of that Declaration: "Solemnly reaffirms . . . that every "Every State has the duty to refrain from organiz~, ing or encouraging the organization ofirregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State. "Every State has the duty to refrain from organiz- ing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts ofcivil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present.,aragraph involve a threat or use of force. " "Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, fmance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, . . . " "Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by it in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. "Every State has the duty to fulfIl in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law," 153. Now, Pakistan and its imperialist, hegemonist and other reactionary patrons are Members of the United Nations, a membership which obliges them fully to adhere to and strictly to abide by the principles of its Charter. Furthermore, Pakistan cast its vote in favour of all the instruments I have just mentioned, and thus bound itself ofits own free will to all the principles contained in them. 154. By any possible interpretation, the imperialist, hegemonistic and reactionary undeclared war against my people constitutes a brazen and blatant act of aggression under international law. The commission of such an act is thus in clear violation of the principles of the Charter and the obligations assumed under those very important instruments ofintemationallaw by those who are engaged in this undeclared war against Afghanistan. 155. Therefore, there is no room for arguing that Afghanistan could not invoke Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and its 1978 bilateral Treaty with the Soviet Union in taking appropriate measures to repel aggression. 156. After the perpetrators of aggression became con- vinced of the flimsiness of their arguments on this matter, they desperately resorted to yet another falsification of the facts. They asserted that the contingents of troops could not have been invited by the legitimate Govern- ment of Afghanistan, since the Head of that Goveniment had been deposed after the troops were introduced into Afghanistan. 157. Either those well-known circles do not have a full knowledge of the nature of our political system or they do not want to understand it. 158. The principle ofdemocratic centralism constitutes the backbone of the working-class parties, of which the Pe9ISJe's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is one. The nature ofthe leadership in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is collective. Decisions on such important Afr~hanista..t1.. 159. Official records of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan belie assertions that no request had been made by the Government ofthe Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the limited contingent of Soviet troops. 160. Faced with rapidly intensifying attacks by bands of armed counter-revolutionaries from Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, from Iran, the Government of the Demo- cratic Republic of Afghanistan had requested the Gov- ernment ofthe Soviet Union, long before December 1979, to render it all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, in order to defend the country in the event of escalation in outside armed interference. After repeated approaches by the Afghan side, this request was met to a very limited extent. 161. What deserves thoughtful c,onsideration are the statements made in the autumn of 1978 by Mr. Agha Shahi, then advisor for foreign affairs to the Chief Mar- tial Law Administrator of Pakistan, when he was passing through Paris. In an article published in the 27 January 1980 issue of The Guardian, Andre Fontaine recalls th&t Mr. Agha Shahi had asserted the presence of "Red Army units of Tadzhiks and Kirgiz . . . operating in Afghan- istan against the rebels". 162. I should also like to draw the Assembly's atten- tion to a press conference given by Amin to local and foreign correspondents, which was broadcast by radio and television in the Democratic Republic of Afghani- stan on 20 August 1979. Asked whether there were Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Amin replied: "We are already implementing the relevant clauses of our Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union." 163. George Rosie, basing his assessment on the paper submitted by Professor Erickson to the Britis1: Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote in the 6 July 198C issue of The Sunday Times ofLondon that: "There were three stages (in the introduction of troops). The first was in March 1979 ••• the second was in April 1979 .•. arid the third . . . was in October 1979." 164. Kuldip Nayar, an Indian journalist who visited Afghanistan several times in the period between 27 April 1978 and 27 December 1979 and had many long inter- views with high-ranking Afghan officia:J, concluded in his book, entitledReport on Afghanistan, that the troops had begun coming to Afghanistan in July 1979. 165. Allow me to recall here a formal meeting between Mr. Georges Perruche, Ambassadcr-at-large in the French dr~wn from very important negotiations with the Soviet Union on the mutual reduction of forces in the Indian Ocean and escalated the build-up of its military forces there, particularly on Diego Garcia Island; that the Unitoo States had already finalized its aggressive and interven- tionist design to establish and deploy its so-called Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in the Middle East, which was later elevated to a larger formation of the United States Central Command force in our neighbourhood; that United States pressure on some African and Asian States to accept United States military bases on their territories was already overwhelming; that the United States had already forced some NATO countries into accepting the deployment of United States Pershing 11 and cruise nuclear missiles on their territories; that the SALT 11 agreements had already been shelv(:d in the United States Senate; that more th. j half a mil- lion members of the United States military forces were already stationed in 429 major military bases and over 3,000 smaller installations throughout the world; and, fmally, that the United States had already launched 217 military and covert subversive operations since the Second World War against independent countries. 176. The reason why we have elaborated in detail on the facts pertinent to the situation prior to the beginning of the new evolutionary phase of our revolution was to expose the falsehood and baselessness of the notion that the problems in South-West Asia emanate from the internal developments in Afghanistan. All the evidence proves beyond any shadow of doubt that the armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghan- istan, :which had begun long before the date in question, was the work of imperialist, hegemonist and other reac- tionary secret services and not an indigenous phenom- enon. It was these armed aggressions that gave rise to the need for military help, and the request far military assist- ance and the introduction ofsome limited contingents had taken place long before 27 December 1979. 177. Whatever evidence we have so far brought to the attention of the General Assem.bly covers only the period up to 27 December 1979. Our honest intention is to shed some light on the darkness deliberately cast on some key NOTES I The delegation of Paraguay subsequently informed the Secretariat that it It"\d intended not to participate in the vote; the delegations of Benin, Colombia and the Niger subsequently informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution; the delegation of Malawi subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain. 2See A/CONF.120/13. 3See Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29August-7September 1983 (United Nations publi- cation, Sales No. E.83.I.21), chap. I. 4The delegations of Benin and the Niger subsequently informed the secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.