A/36/PV.52 General Assembly

The representative of Israel has asked to speak on a point of order. I call on him.

Mr. President, on a point of order I should like with your permission respectfully to inquire about the appropriateness of your presiding over this item. I think that representative~ will readily agree that there is something sllghlly incongruous about a de- bate being chaired by a President who comes from the country which is the main protagonist. Representa~ives will also not have overlooked the fact that when the Item now before the Assembly was discussed in the Security Council last June the President was personally involved and indeed took a prominent part in presenting· Iraq's complaint about my country. 4. In the circumstances, therefore, and with all the re- spect due to the presidency, I wonder if in the interests of elementary fairness the President should not hand over the conduct of this item to one of the Vice-Presidents.

Rule 71 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly reads as follows: NIW YORK "During the discussion of any matter, a representa- tive may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in ac- cordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The ap- peal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the Pres- ident's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the su~­ stance of the matter under discussion." That is the rule applicable to this point of order. 6. The representative of Israel ~as raised a s~ci!ic, con- cise point of order: h.e has ques~loned ~hether It IS appro- priate for me to preside over this-or mdeed any other- item. My ruling is that it is appropriate. The fact that th.e President has other capacities and speaks in other capaci- ties during his career has nothing to do with the conduct of business in this Hall. I leave it to the judgement of the Member States and the Assembly as a whole to decide on past practice thus far in the thirty-sixth session, .or when the present debate is concluded, whether. the ~sldent ~as conducted the affairs of the Assembly Impartially, fairly and in an appropriate manner, or otherwise. 7. That is my ruling and it will stand, under rule 71, unless there is an appeal against it. 8. The ruling stands. 9. I might simply add that the fa~t that I. at any time relinquish the Chair to one of the Vlce-Presl~ents sho~ld in no way be interpreted to mean that there IS a question about my judgement or fairness in the conduct of my du- ties.

On 7 June 1981, whel! American-supplied Israeli aircraft bombarded the .Iraqi nuclear installations near Baghdad, a new and omlDous chapter was opened in the an!l~ls of ~et! agg~ssion. The aerial attack was not a milItary action ID a balateral conflict nor should it be considered strictly within the context 'of the long-standing Zionist aggression against the Arab nation. It was not simply yet anotJter Zionist act of State terrorism violating the Charter of the United .Nations and endangering international peace and secunty; the damage done extended far beyond the nuclear facilities near Baghdad, and the implications are far more threaten- ing. The Zionist act of aggression was also an attack against IAEA, the international safeguards system, the 1l'eaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and the internationally es- tablished principles conc~rning the pe~efuI. u~s of atomic energy. Above all, It was the first time ID h.l~tory that a nuclear facility was made the target of a mlhtary attack. A dangerous precedent has been established. The attack has escalated the odds of a nuclear war .being un- ieashed by adding the new dimension of a pre-emptive strike. The Tel Aviv regime has given the world yet an- other push towards anarchy and ultimate annihilation. 12. In view of the special importance it attaches to inter- national co-operation in the field of atomic energy, Iraq has concluded bilateral agreements with several States. All those agreements are in full conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu- clear Weapons and the IAEA safeguards system. The co- operation agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear en- ergy, signed on 8 November 1975 by France and Iraq, is subject to both bilateral and international non-proliferation arrangements. In this connection I should like to state the following relevant facts. 13. First, France, although not a signatory to the Non- Proliferation Treaty, has repeatedly stated that it will be- have as if it were a party to the Treaty. It has made it amply clear that it will ensure that sound non-proliferation measures are applied to nuclear technology transfer to any second party. 14. Secondly, the Franco-Iraqi agreement explicitly calls for the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear ma- terial and equipment transferred und~r the agreement. These safeguards shall continue to be applied whether or not Iraq continues to be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 15. Thirdly, Iraq, for the purpose of implementing this agreement, has accepted measures beyond those called for by the Treaty requirements, such as physical protection measures on all materials and equipment supplied by France. EURATOM, as well as IAEA, is aware of these arrangements. 16. Fourthly, in addition, Iraq and France have also signed an agreement on co-operation in peaceful nuclear research, the main purpose of which is to utilize jointly the facilities that were being built by France in Iraq. This arrangement would have resulted in the continuous pres- ence of French personnel on the nuclear site had the reac- tor become operational. 17. In spite of these security arrangements, France and other countries which had concluded co-operation agree- ments with Iraq were subjected to a campaign of vile at- tacks and pressures. The severity of the campaign during the summer of 1980 prompted Mr. Jean Fran~ois-Poncet, then Foreign Minister of France, to question the reasons for the campaign. He issued a statement on 17 July 1980 which listed 34 other countries, including Israel, which to that date had imported 78 research reactors of the same type operating on enriched uranium. Most of those reac- tors were of American construction. On 29 July of last year the French Government issued another statement ex- pressing astonishment at the fabricated accusations being levelled against it for its co-operation with Iraq. It re- affirmed that the co-operation of the French Government with Iraq was carried out with perfectly legitimate objec- tives and was covered by all the necessary safeguards. 18. The Zionists did not limit themselves to waging this vicious verbal campaign against Franco-Iraqi co-opera- tion, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards re- gime of IAEA; they resorted to acts of terrorism, intim- idation, sabotage and assassination in order to obstruct -In 1979 Zionist agents committed acts of sabotage in France, exploding equipment destined for shipment to Iraq; -In 1980 the Egyptian physicist, Dr. Yahia Al- Meshad, who was "Norking for the Iraqi Government, was assassinated in Pdris. Two other Iraqi scientists hav~ ~ied in mysterious circumstances at Geneva and in Pdris; -French and Italian experts, and their families, who were working on projects in Iraq received letters threaten- ing them with assassination unless they stopped working on those projects. Bombs were planted and exploded in some offices in Rome; -On 27 September 1980, Isareli planes staged a pre- liminary attack on our nuclear centre; -AJrthermore, the Zionists violated the integrity of the safeguards system and the principle of confidentiality which is essential to its operation by recruiting the serv- ices of an Agency safeguards inspector, a Mr. Roger Richter, who had not been designated as an inspector for Iraq, to pass on confidential Agency documents to a United States congressman. The Director General pointed out the seriousness of this case to the Board of Governors on 6 July 1981. The man was summarily dismissed from the Agency's service on the grounds of serious miscon- duct. The Director General also gave instructions for an urgent and thorough review of the whole pattern of se- curity and confidentiality of safeguard material and docu- mentation. The case provides another example of the Zio- nists' efforts to undermine the effectiveness and the credibility of the Agency and its safeguards regime. 19. The Zionists' campaign of terror culminated in the armed attack of 7 June on the Iraqi nuclear installations. On 9 June the Director General of IAEA stated, in rela- tion to that act of aggression, before the Agency's Board of Governors: "Iraq has been a party to the Non-Proliferation 1i'eaty since it came into force in 1970. In accordance with that Treaty, Iraq accepts Agency safeguards on all its nuclear activities. These safeguards have been satis- factorily applied to date, including during the recent period of armed conflict with Iran. The last safeguards inspection at the Iraqi nuclear centre took place in Jan- uary of this year, and all nuclear material there was satisfactorily accounted for. This material included the fuel so far delivered for the Tamuz reactor." 20. The next inspection was due to take place in July, but it was not carried out because of the Israeli aggres- sion. The Director General informed the Assembly at the 50th meeting that, according to. information he had re- ceived from the Ira'nn authorities, it now seems reasonably safe to approach the reactor site, and the Iraqi authorities are accordingly prepared to receive the Agency's inspec- tors at any time the Agency desires to send them. He also informed the Assembly that the Agency would be sending an inspection team to Baghdad very shortly. 2I . We thank Mr. Eklund for his statement and for the information he gave to the General Assembly. We propose that he be invited to address the Assembly on this item to give his views on the matter before us, the implications of AI~6/61O. 22. In contrast to the peaceful nature of the Iraqi pro- gramme for the use of nuclear energy, the founders of the Zionist entity had conspired from the very beginning to acquire nuclear weapons to guarantee their domination of the entire Middle East through the establishment of "Greater Israel". The full details of the development of the Israeli nuclear programme have been placed before both the Security Council and the General Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Iraq. Ample evidence of Israel's nuclear capability has been presented. Suffice it to men- tion that the Central Intelligency Agency [CIA] itself, in a memorandum dated 4 September 1974 and released on 26 January 1978, disclosed its conclusion that Israel had pro- duced atomic weapons. I refer to Ernest Lefever's report, Nuclear Arms in the Third Word. I In the report submitted by the Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament at the request of the Secretary-General [A/36/43J], further details concerning the nuclear arms capability of Israel are documented. 23. Mr. Shamir. the ex-leader of the notorious terrorist Stem Gang and now the Foreign Minister of Israel, in his statement in the general debate objected to the formula- tion of the item before us, alleging that it prejudges the outcome of the debate. The Zionists should be made aware of the fact that the Israeli armed attack against Iraq has already been universally condemned as unjustifiable, unprovoked and absolutely impermissible. When Iraq brought its complaint before the Security Council, more than 50 speakers participated in the debate. The represen- tative of Mexico, who was the President of the Council, commented:::! "Few times have so many voices been raised to express the same things: alarm, indignation and condemnation". 24. My delegation could not do better than refer to his excellent summary of the statements, which, as he said, "clearly show the convergence of views of the spokesmen of the international community". The summary was made in the following 15 points. -First, the military action which the Council consid- ered was an act of aggression under the terms of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), which embodied the definition of aggression. The illegality of that act was compounded by the violation of the air space of two Member States of the United Nations. -Second, the attack was totally unjustified, since the aggressor State offered no proof that the Iraqi installations were for military purposes. On the contrary, the compe- tent international organization and the States which worked on and implemented the project gave conclusive evidence regarding its purely peaceful nature and .objec- tives. -Third, the suspicion invoked by Israel, which came from doubtful confidential sources of information, did not authorize it to commit aggression. If the aggressor had truly felt a threat to its integrity, it had effective multi- lateral and bilateral recourses available to it in order to avoid that threat. -Fourth, the reasons on which Israel bases its conten- tionconcerning self:det"ence are as unacceptable under The Charter as the act of aggression it committed. -Seventh, the Israeli act of aggression is evidence of a rejection of peaceful means for the solution of the con- flicts in the Middle East. -Eighth, the destruction of the nuclear plant, whose purposes were peaceful, reveals an intention to affirm the strategic and technological superiority of one State over others. -Ninth, aggression against a country that is not a member of any military pact or alliance damages non- alignment, and, were it to go unpunished, it would call into question the sovere~gn viability of nations. -Tenth, the warlike initiative by Israel undermines the foundations of the disarmament process and chal- lenges the non-proliferation regime which has been so carefully built up by the international community. W'nile Israel is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it took the liberty of attacking Iraq, which has submitted scmpulously to the existing safe- guards regime. -Eleventh, the Israeli action demonstrates contempt for the authority of IAEA, and by casting aspersions on the effectiveness of that Agency, Israel has proved its contempt for the United Nations system. Israel is attack- ing not only the security of a State but the very principle of international security. -Twelfth, given that the Iraqi installations were a re- sult of the protracted efforts of a people to make a qualitative advance in the scientific and technological field, their destruction amounts to an attempt to restrain the struggle for development. -Thirteenth, the argument put forward that a country with oil has no reason to gain access to alternative sources of energy contradicts the aims which the interna- tional community has set for itself. -Fourteenth, the continuous violations committed by the aggressor Government call into question the political and economic relations based on goodwill which many countries maintain with the people of Israel. That explains the fact that many condemnations came from Govern- ments which are friendly to the Israeli nation. Out of re- spect for the basic principles of international coexistence, it is unacceptable that ties of co-operation with. any coun- try should serve as encouragement for or the instrument of policies of expansion and aggression. -Fifteenth, the view of the international community was unanimous, as was its conviction that the Security Council must act unequivocally to live up to its responsi- bility as a guarantor of peace. With varying degrees of emphasis and various nuances, speakers called on the Council to go beyond mere condemnation and to adopt measures, as effective as possible, aimed at halting ag- gression and restoring peaceful alternatives for the solu- tion of present conflicts. 26. In view of the fact that the Security Council was prevented from fully shouldering its responsibility under the Charter in dealing with the Israeli act of aggression, the General Assembly is called upon to remedy the situa- tion within its competence under the Charter and to try to restore the dignity of the Organization, especially consid- ering that Israel has rejected the unanimous decision of the Council in its resolution 487 (1981). 27. The General Assembly should strongly condemn Is- rael for its act of aggression. It should again call '~pon all States to cease forthwith any provision to Israel of arms and related material of all types which enable it to com- mit acts of aggression against other States. We should re- quest the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other States and parties in those activities. The Assembly should also reiterate its request to the Council to institute effective enforcement action so as to prevent Israel from further endangering international peace and security. The Assembly should solemnly warn Israel to cease its threats and the commis- sion of armed attacks against nuclear installations. 28. My delegation firmly believes that if the Council is preve,nted yet again from adopting effective measures against Israel under the relevant provisions of the Charter. action should be instituted whereby the Assembly could pronounce itself on the question. 29. Finally, I should like to reaffirm from this rostrum that Iraq will never succumb to attempts at intimidation and pressure. The Zionist act of aggression against our installations has only strengthened our resolve to defend our rights and the rights of the Arab people as a whole. We shall redouble our efforts to attain the technological and scientific advances that are necessary to ensure a fu- ture of dignity and prosperity for generations to come. 30. Mr. BlUM (Israel): On 7 June 1981 Israel per- formed an elementary act of self-preservation. The ago- nizing decision to destroy Osirak was taken only when it had become absolutely certain that the Iraqi nuclear reac- tor was on the verge of going operational. with a view to producing nuclear weapons. the principal target of which would have been Israel. By neutralizing Osirak Israel was exercising its inherent right of self-defence, as understood in general international law and as preserved in Article 51- of the Charter. 32. As the case of Iraq has demonstrated, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons cannot prevent a country like Iraq, bent on the destruction of Israel, from acquiring all the components required for the development of nuclear weapons. Israel has long believed in a differ- ent, more constructive approach, aimed at removing the nuclear threat to the Middle East. We advocate the estab- lishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, grounded in a multilateral treaty reached through di- rect negotiations among all the States concerned. Now is the time for the Organization to advance the cause of non- proliferation and peace in the Middle East, instead of en- gaging in hypocritical rhetoric. 33. Before going into the substance of the matter before the Assembly, let me draw attention to the prejudicial manner in which this item has been formulated. It has been enunciated in such a way as to avoid discussion of the calculated Iraqi efforts to develop a nuclear option and, at the same time, to predetermine the outcome of the Assembly's deliberations. Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any room left at all for serious debate, since.the result is a foregone conclusion and the Assem- bly is engaged in what is essentially an exercise in futility. In the circumstances, there is no need for me to repeat Israel's position at length. I would refer represen- tatives to my statements in the Security Council on 12 and 19 June 1981 J and also to the detailed document of my Government entitled "The Iraqi nuclear threat-why Israel had to act", circulated at my request as the annex to document A/36/610 of 20 October 1981. I shall there- fore focus only on the main points of Israel's position. 34. Ever since the estabI1shment of the State of Israel more than 33 years ago, Iraq has been conspiring to de- stroy it. Iraq joined several other Arab States which at- tacked Israel the day it became independent in 1948. Yet while other Arab States-Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria-signed a.rmistice agreements with Israel in 1949, Iraq adamantly refused to do so. Instead, it fomented and supported open Arab belligerency and terrorism against Israel. It took part in the Arab wars against Israel in 1967 and 1973. It has doggedly rejected any international measure or instrument which might imply even the most indirect recognition of Israel and its right to exist. It has rejected all United Nations efforts to seek a peaceful s.et- t1ement of the Arab-Israel dispute. It has publicly rejected ! Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). . And it took the lead in establishing the Arab rejectionist camp set up in Baghdad to combat the peace process initi- ated at Camp David. Despite its deep involvement in the war of aggression against Iran. Iraq has continued to indi- cate its willingness to send men and I1w/eriel to take part in any military hostilities which the rejectionist Arab States may initiate against Israel. 35. Iraq has consistently made it clear that it would "not abide by international law with respect to Israel and that 36. The principles underlying that Charter were sup- posed to include, inter alia, the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Yet a specific exclusion was made with regard to Israel on the grounds that it was "a deformed entity" which was "not considered a State" .5 That same Charter committed Iraq in no uncer- tain terms to all-out warfare against Israel and enjoined other Arab States to participate in that war, using "all means and techniques". 6 37. This undisguised denial by one United Nations Member State of the right of another Member to exist is in tlagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. It is regrettable that a document so violently op- posed to everything that the United Nations stands for should have been circulated as an official document at all. But apparently such gross violations of the principles of the Charter, including paragraph 4 of Article 2, are per- fectly in order. As far as we have been able to ascertain, the Security Council-or, for that matter, the United Nations as a whole-has never over the last 30 or so years called Iraq to account for its aggressive stand against a State Member of the United Nations. 38. There is no question that Iraq regards itself as being in a state of war with Israel. Its leaders admit this openly and have called time and again for the liquidation of my country. To translate its words into deeds. Iraq has used its petrodollars to develop a sophisticated military in- frastructure. 39. Since the mid-1970s a new dimension has been added to Iraq's military preparations against Israel. Over and beyond its conventional forces and their development. Iraq has been implementing, methodically and pur- posefully, a programme to acquire a nuclear option. 40. In 1974 Iraq attempted to acquire a 500-megawatt nuclear power reactor of the gas-graphite type. This reac- tor had been developed in the 1950s for the production, inter alia. of large quantities of plutonium for military use. It was capable of producing some 400 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually. It should be noted that most of the military plutonium -of the nuclear-weap- ons States is produced by this type of reactor. After its request for the 5OO-megawatt nuclear power reactor had been turned down, Iraq did not accept alternative offers of conventional nuclear power reactors but, rather, demanded and acquired a 70-megawatt nuclear reactor of the Osiris type. Of all available research reactors, the Osiris type is one of the most suitable for the production of weapons- grade plutonium in significant quantities. 41. As part of the same package, Iraq insisted on ac- quiring about 80 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium for use in the reactor, which in Iraq was officially known as Tamuz I and is generally called Osirak. In 1979 Iraq re- jected offers of a far lower grade of enriched uranium fuel, known as "Caramel", and insisted on the original arrangement. To carry that deal through, the supplier had to draw on stockpiles in its own military nuclear arsenal. 42. In parallel, Iraq has also purchased large quantities of uranium concentrates through bilateral deals. In 1980 Iraq received the first shipment of weapons-grade ura- 43. Nor did Iraq stop with the purchase of Osirak aria weapons-grade uranium. To acquire complete self-reliance in its nuclear weapons programme, Iraq purchased com- plementary fuel cycle technology, namely, four research laboratories for the study of the chemical processes of fuel preparation and its recycling, as well as the re- processing of irradiated fuel. From the nuclear weapons point of view, the most significant item on its shopping list was a radio-chemistry laboratory, known as the "hot cell", used for the separation of irradiated fuel and the extraction of plutonium. This project was scheduled for completion this year. 44. Beyond the purchase and construction of these facil- ities, Iraq has also been energetically investigating the possibility of acquiring upgraded plutogenic power reac- tors, which operate on natural uranium and heavy water and which could produce large quantities of plutonium. 45. And again this is still by no means the end of the story. Iraq already possesses aircraft capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Not satisfied with that, it is involved in the development of a new surface-to-surface missile with an effective range of up to 3,000 kilometres, also capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. The distance between Baghdad and Jerusalem is 800 kilometres. 46. In brief, it was clear that by 1985 Iraq would be in possession of sufficient weapons-grade plutonium to pro- duce at least one nuclear explosive device and would also have the means of delivering such a device. 47. All this activity. patently designed to acquire a nu- clear option·, did not prevent Iraq from hypocritically ap- pending its signature to international instruments specifi- cally prohibiting it from developing a nuclear option. namely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA safeguards agreement. 48. Iraq's preference for Osirak and the complementary fuel cycle facilities pointed towards a premeditated at- tempt to exploit the limitations on IAEA safeguards re- garding this type of reactor for the purpose of embarking on a nuclear weapons programme without risking detec- tion. This was so because such safeguards do not apply to research within the reactor. 49. Moreover. no television or photographic surveillance measures for monitoring between inspection visits were foreseen under the existirig safeguards approach for such research reactors. As a result. no means would be avail- able to provide indication of diversion between inspec- tions. 50. As I have already mentioned, during 1980 Iraq re- ceived a shipment of weapons-grade uranium. Thereafter, Iraq promptly denied IAEA inspection. Such unilateral actions could have been repeated by Iraq on future occa- sions when additional shipments of weapons-grade en- riched uranium had been received by Iraq. 51. I have already pointed out that, parallel to ordering weapons-grade uranium. Iraq purchased large quantities of uranium concentrates to ensure an adequate supply of raw material for its programme. These purchases too were not subject to safeguards. And except for the production 52. As far as the complementary fuel cycle facilities were concerned, they also had a great advantage for Iraq. They too would remain outside the scope of safeguards as long as Iraq maintained that it was not producing pluto- nium or nuclear fuel. 53. In other words, Iraq could proceed with its nuclear weapons programme and, once ready, it could exercise its right of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty on three months' notice, as provided for in article X of the Treaty, without fear of sanctions. Even if an unlikely at- tempt were made to impose sanctions on Iraq, the process would be ineffectual. To quote from HA Short History of Non-Proliferation", a document published by IAEA: HHistory has shown that the extent to which international bodies can impose fully effective sanctions on national governments is limited". 54. Over the last six years Israel has tried to have this threat halted by diplomatic means. Since 1975 Israel has conducted diplomatic contacts at various levels with Gov- ernments which Israel believed could avert the dangerous developments in Iraq: Israel was careful to ensure that those contacts would remain as discreet as possible, in order to ensure that all those approached would have complete freed9m to act. 55. In view of the ineffectiveness of existing safeguards with respect to Osirak-type reactors, Israel was clearly faced with a mortal danger. It was and is inconceivable that a country so threatened would entrust its fundamental security to an inspection procedure which is contractually limited, which is not unconditional or binding and which is substantially dependent both in character and duration on the discretion of th,e country posing the threat. 56. Israel's military operation of 7 June 1981 against Osirak was neither an attack on IAEA nor an expression of no confidence in its system of safeguards. Israel appre- ciates the earnest efforts of the IAEA staff to discharge its duties within the limits of the IAEA mandate. Hence, we regret the arbitrary and discriminatory action taken against Israel at the recent General Conference of the Agency. In adopting the resolution against Israel, the General Conference has been subjected to the familiar Arab attempts aimed at converting yet another interna- tional agency into an instrument of political warfare against Israel. 57. Israel has supported the principle of non-prolifera- tion in all discussions in international forums and it has also joined multilateral arms control agreements and has supported resolutions aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 58. On 12 June 1968 Israel voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), the annex to which contained the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It did so in the belief that this would enhance pmctical and satisfactory solutions for the prevention of th~ proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since then J~niel has studied the various aspects of the Non- Proliferation Treaty in reference to the conditions prevail- ing :.n the Middle East and has concluded that the tur- 59. Many Arab States are not bound by the Treaty re- gime or by the IAEA safeguards system. Some Arab States which are parties to the Treaty have not fulfilled their obligations in accordance with it, or have entered reservations specifically dissociating themselves from any obligation towards Israel in the context of the Treaty. 60. Iraq's nuclear activities have troubled many Govern- ments and experts around the world. Many questions re- main unanswered, including those which I addressed to Iraq's Foreign Minister in the Security Council on 19 June2 and which I should like to repeat here: -First, why did Iraq first try in 1974 to acquire a 500-megawatt nuclear reactor, of a kind designed, inter alia, to produce large quantities of plutonium for military use? Why the continued efforts to buy an upgraded plu- togenic power reactor, whose military use is clear, but whose commercial use is not proven? -Second, why did Iraq insist on receiving a 70-mega- watt reactor which has no usable application as an energy source? -Third, why did Iraq insist on receiving weapons- grade nuclear fuel, rather than the less proliferant alterna- tive of "Caramel" fuel which it was offered? -Fourth, what is Iraq's demonstrable need for nuclear energy, given its abundant oil reserves? -Fifth, if Iraq has aneed of this kind for either the short or the long term, why has it not developed a com- mercial nuclear energy programme? Why has it not made any transactions which would be relevant to such a pro- gramme? -Sixth, why, if it is genuinely interested in nuclear research, did it rush to buy plutonium separation technol- ogy and equipment that cannot be justified on scientific or economic grounds? -Seventh, why has Iraq been making frenetic efforts to acquire large quantities of natural uranium which is not under IAEA safeguards? Why has Iraq taken the highly unusual step of stockpiling uranium before it has built power reactors? 61 . Iraq's unwillingness to answer these questions and others speaks louder than words. 62. The Government of Israel, like any other Govern- ment, has the elementary duty to protect the lives of its citizens. In destroying Osirak, Israel was exercising its , inherent and natural right of self-defence, as understood in general international law and well within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter. 63. The concept of a State's right of self-defence has not changed throughout recorded history, Its scope has, how- ever, broadened with the advance of man's ability to wreak havoc on his enemies. Consequently, this concept took on a new and far wider application with the advent of the nuclear era. Anyone who thinks otherwise has -sim- ply not faced up to the horrific realities of the world we 64. Commenting on the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, Professors Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenback wrote in their standard work, The Political Foundations of International Law: "Must a state wait until it is too late before it may defend i.tself? Must it permit another the advantages of military build-up, surprise attack, and total offense, against which there may be no defense? It would be unreasonable to expect any state to permit this-partic- ularly when given the possibility that a surprise nuclear blow might bring about total destruction, or at least total subjugation, unless the attack were forestalled. "7 65. Israel is mindful of the many political differences existing among the States of the Middle East, a region characterized by conflict and tension with many sources of upheaval and unrest from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the lack of comprehensive peace in the region should not condemn the Middle East to live under nuclear threat. 66. The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to the Middle East can best be assured by a regional non- proliferation regime and by arms control arrangements freely arrived at and negotiated in good faith by the States of the region. An effective non-proliferation regime must be based on the establishment of a system of mutually binding obligations among all the States of the region, which would assure each one of them of the others' com- pliance with the terms of a freely negotiated convention. 67. Israel believes that the most effective way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the Middle East is through the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, modeled on the Tlatelolco Treaty,8 which is based on the initiative of Latin American States and on direct negotiations among them. Israel has repeatedly given ex- pression to this idea and since 1974 has advocated it an- nually in this Assembly. 68. On 31 October 1980, at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Israel submitted draft resolution A/C.I/35/L.8:1 which called upon: " . . . all States of the Middle East and non-nu- clear-weapon States adjacent to the region, which are not signatories to any treaty providing for a nuclear- weapon-free zone, to convene at the earliest p05sible date a conference with a view to negotiating a multi- lateral treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East". 69. Israel also urged that all States of the region indicate their willingness to participate in such a conference. To Israel's regret, its proposal was rejected by a number of Arab States, most significantly by Iraq, whose representa- tives asserted at the 36th meetiflg of the First Committee, on 20 November 1980, that Israel's draft resolution was "of no practical value". 71. The General Assembly now has a clear-cut choice before it. It can either resign itself to the perpetuation of the well-established pattern of one-sided denunciations of my country, which can only serve as a cover and encour- agement for those that entertain destructive designs against it, or, alternatively, it can address itself seriously to the perils and challenges that C0I1__ . . us all. If these perils and challenges are sucessfully met, an historic contribution can be made towards further advancing the cause of peace in the Middle East.

I call on the Observer of the League of Arab States, in accordance with General As- sembly resolution 477 (V) of 1 November 1950.

Israel's blitzkrieg on Iraq's nuclear research facilities on 7 June 1981 demonstrates, as Mr. Sigvard Eklund, Director Gen- eral of IAEA, stated when introducing his report yester- day, that: ". . . the Treaty Ion the Non-Proliferation of Nu- clear Weapons], and by extension the Agency's safe- guards regime, suffered a blow in June of this year when a non-Treaty country, Israel, carried out a mili- tary attack against the research reactor in Iraq, a party to the Treaty and thus subject to IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities. I have expressed my deep con- cern over this development in the Security Council as well as to the Board of Governors and in the General Conference of the Agency." [50th meeting, para. 21.] 74. That is perhaps a most concise, neutral statement which reports a fact and an incident. It draws the conclu- sion, however, that the Israeli attack inflicted a blow on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Agency's safeguards system. That is perhaps a neutral and dry conclusion, but it cannot be controverted; it has become a judgement of history. " 75. However, it is not sufficient, indeed it is utterly in- adequate, for the world community simply to record Is- rael's attack on Iraq's nuclear research facilities last June, which constituted a far-reaching development in the evo- lution of Israel's policy of aggression and added a new dimension to its quest for strategic 'hegemony and domi- nance. 76. Because of this, the Security Council on 19 June unanimously condemned that blatant aggression, thus dis- crediting and disproving once and for all Israel's counter- arguments and claims, repeated this morning in the Gen- eral Assembly, which no one-absolutely no one-be- lieves. The unanimity with which Israel's attack was con- demned removes the last vestiges of the credibility that a few; especially in the United States. wanted to believe Israel had. 77. Condemnation without sanctions in the Israeli case becomes a form of biting without teeth. Israel has repeat- edly treated the un:versal condemnations of its aggressive 78. The United States, in particular, was eager for the logical conclu~ion to be postponed and for the resolution instead to be confined to condemnation. The United States was also eager to interpret its condemnation as a major diplomatic step and concession which would give Israel an incentive to cease further similar attacks and ag- gression. That was not only a miscalculation by the United States of its own relationship with Israel, but a misreading of the thrust of Israel's ideology and behaviour pattern. Moreover, it was a form of wishful thinking in a situation in which normal yardsticks have been proved to be completely inoperative and inapplicable. 79. Yet the United States, cognizant of the implications of Israel's aggression against Iraq's nuclear facility, real- ized that it could not, in all good conscience, withstand the irreversible pressure of the need to impose sanctions. The United States realized that under no circumstances would condemnation be sufficient or adequate. If sanc- tions were to be avoided, credible warnings about the consequences of repeated Israeli actions had to be fac- tored into the. resolution. The result was not only unan- imity of condemnation but the imposition of what might be construed as punitive measures. Those measures fell short of sanctions but they included points which, if com- plied with, would constitute a form of deterrence, inade- quate and insufficient though it might be, sufficient to make the implementation of the Security Council resolu- tion a step in the direction of genuine deterrence. 80. As we know, that minimum standard that emerged in the Security Council on 19 June was not met by Israel. Condemnation was treated by Israel with its usual con- tempt. 81. Security Council resolution 4H7 (1981) called upon Israel "to refrain . . . from any such acts or threats thereof'. What happened? Israel continued its illegal en- croachment and violation of Lebanon's skies and airspace and attacked Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, on 10 and 12 July 1981 in one of the most vicious and barbaric air strikes of our time. In paragraph 5 of that resolution the Council called upon Israel "urgently to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Eflergy Agency". Israel to this day has not placed its fa- cilities under IAEA safeguards and refuses to allow lAEA officials to inspect Israel's nuclear facilities in Dimona. 82. In paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Council consid- ered that "Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged". Israel has not taken the necessary measures to bring about the appropriate redress. 83. It is clear, therefore, that Israel stands today in con- tempt-utter contempt-of resolution 487 (1981), and for that reason the item has been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. If those facts have become well estab- lished and well known, it does not mean, as one senior 84. However, as long as the texture of Israel's Zionist ideology and its aggressive and expansionist behaviour re- main the determining constant in its overall posture, pol- icies and behaviour, then in no circumstances can the at- tack on Iraq's research facilities be treated either in isolation or as an aberration. 85. The attack has to be treated in the context of Israel's proclivity to violate international law, United Nations res- olutions and the sovereignty of countries and of its addic- tion to aggression, inherent in ti"e very circumstances of Israel's creation, ideology and policy. It has become im- perative that the world community take the nece::;!lary measures that will constitute a credible disincentiv,,;; for Israel to continue to pursue its unilateral defiance of the inte~ational will and the international consensus. 86. We have seen how Israel has in recent days violated the airspace of Saudi Arabia and how it violates almost daily the airspace of Lebanon and claims that as a matter of utter right. This is a clear case of Israel seeking to institutionalize the Nazi doctrine that led to the Second World War-that might, and only might, is right. This, as the repres(~ntatives to the General Assembly fully real- ize, is not only intolerable but dangerous and destabiliz- ing. 87. Clearly, when a policy is predicated on the hypoth- esis that might, and only might, is right, it follows that any means justifies the end. This twin policy of Israel has beerr amply demonstrated, and the preparations that pre- ceded its premeditated aggression on Iraq have also been amply demonstrated. Preparations for the' implementation of this policy, with its dual manifestations, were made long ago. I do not want to dwell .here on all the prepara- tions that were made by I5lraeI to execute its nuclear pol- icy. The Iraqi representar.ive has made a comprehensive and objective study of the background. Suffice it to men- tion here a few of the ur.challenged facts and events. 88. First, in 1965, highly enriched uranium disappeared from a United States Government-sponsored nuclear facil- ity at Apollo, Pennsylvania. United States Government agencies came to the firm conclusion that Israel had ..stolen" this material. 89. Secondly, in November 1968, 200 tons of uranium oxide bound for Genoa disappeared from the cargo ship Sheersberg. The captain of the ship later admitted that the cargo had been transferred at sea and delivered to Israel. 90. Thirdly, in November 1976, 13 United States sena- tors, led by Senator Ribicoff and Senator Javit~, were bar- red while on a Middle East fact-finding tour from inspect- , ing Israel's nuclear research facilities at Dimona in the Negev desert. Senator Ribicoff told reporters that Israel reserved the right to undertake its own research in private without international supervision. At the time, a United States official estimated that the secret facilities at Di- mona had a large enough plutol1ium stockpile to produce more than 20 atomic bombs. 91 . From the foregoing facts it is clear that Israel. not only planned to acquire the atomic bomb by all means, 92. It is also clear that the reluctance to follow up on the resolution of the Security Council enabled Israel to assume that it had a license to strike at will and to persist in its defiance of United Nations resolutions. 93. We were surprised that the United States, while joining the denunciation, hedged its attitude with so many excuses for the attack as to reduce the denunciation to little more than a gesture. In doing so, the United States weakened not only the chances of compliance by the ag- gressor, but also its own laws, which were utterly dis- regarded when Israel used American-supplied warplanes in Iraq, then. in Lebanon, and most recently in the skies of Saudi Arabia. 94. We are aware of the United States commitment to the security of Israel, although we do not know what it is. But should that pledge be honoured at all costs and to the detriment of the security of other countries in the Middle East? Does it mean that Israel, in addition to its butcher- ing of defenceless Lebanon and its war threats against Syria, can now reach hundreds of miles beyond its bor- ders to strike any target for any reason with impunity? If in the past the United States has found it conveniently difficult to decide whether Israeli actions-the occupation of Arab territory, the total denial of Pdlestinian rights, the annexation of Jerusalem, the bloody intervention in Lebanon-constituted aggression, the raid on Iraq was an open-and-shut case. 95. Menachem Begin openly and brazenly boasted that the attack was premeditated. What was worse, Begin's justification for the raid was based on reasons that were totally and absolutely disproved. 96. He lied when he claimed that Iraq had prevented IAEA inspectors from examining the nuclear reactor near Baghdad. The Agency's experts made a full inspection of the Iraqi facility last January and were due to make an- other visit in June. 97. He lied when he claimed that Iraq was secretly working on a nuclear weapon programme. The Agency, which is responsible for enforcing safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear arms, vehemently denied that Iraq was involved in anything but peaceful research. 98. Begin again lied when he charged that there was a secret chamber 40 metres below the Iraqi reactor being prepared for military purposes. He later struck off a zero, saying the chamber was only 4 metres below ground. The truth is that no such secret place existed. . 99. And there were more false allegations: that the Iraqi President, Mr. Saddam Hussein, had threatened to use nu- clear weapons against Israel; that United States intel- ligence officials had tipped off Israel to Iraq's intention to build an atomic bomb; that the Iraqi reactor would be- come operational in early July. All were refuted totally. 100. These were fabrications designed to cover up Is- 107. While I was speaking on this very point yesterday, rael's real objective: to destroy the scientific potential and politicizing amendments were being prepared to draft res- technological achievements of Iraq and any other Arab olution Al36/L.IO, which the United States fully sup- country. ported as originally drafted, which applauds the work of 102. There is no doubt that Israel wants to maintain a monopoly on nlJclear technology in the Midd!e East be- cause scientific progress in the Arab world means the end of Israel's ability to terrorize its neighbours and interfere in their affairs. In the modern world technology is a power that can be used for good or ill. Israel has chosen to use its grasp of science and technology for aggressive purposes and therefore fears that others around it will do the same.That is the mentality of fascism, which sees in everybody a mirror of its own ideology. . 103. That is why the General Assembly has this item before it, and the necessary measures should be taken to render the United Nations resolutions credible and effec- tive. To allow Israel the ability to paralyse the United Nations mechanism, defy the Charter, violate resolutions and spell out in its own terms what constitutes interna- tional law is tantamount to allowing an outlaw to take the law into his own hands. To allow Israel to dictate to !his body its terms of reference in order to provide prior li- censing for its planned and future and subsequent aggres- sion and threats is to undermine the purposes and objec- tives for which the Organization was created.

I shall now call upon those rep- resentatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote be- fore the voting on draft resolution Al36/L.IO and the amendments in document Al36/L.12. I remind the As- sembly that staements in explanation of vote should not exceed 10 min:!ltes and should be made by representatives from their seats.

At the 51st meeting I spoke to the Assembly in praise of IAEA and in regret about the trend towards politicization in that as in other United Nations specialized agencies, all of which have important missions to fulfil. As I spoke such politicization continued, and in a rather disorderly manner. 106. Precisely this type of politicization has a demon- strated capacity to paralyse and to destroy activities by United Nations specialized agencies, making it difficult or even impossible at times for them to achieve their worthy missions. Di~ctor General of IAEA. 109. We firmly oppose the language of the first amend- ment. It focuses Ilpon the attack of last June, a matter whi~h the most ~\ppropriate body of the United Nations, namely the Security Council, dealt with at length and on which it reached consensus agreement. 110. Nothing has happened on this matter since the Se- curity Council's lengthy.deliberations. Even though nOI\h- ing has happened since then, that attack is none the less the subject of, first, this amendment to an otherwise sup- portive draft resolution, secondly, this very day's debate in the General Assembly under agenda item 130, and, thirdly, a draft resolution in the First Committee [AI C.1I36IL.30]. Ill. To any objective observer this would appear to be a most disorganized, even chaotic, manner in which to handle a topic that does not need to be handled once again by any part of the United Nations. 112. We consider the second amendment, calling upon all Member States to respect the Charter and to refrain from attacking nuclear installations, to be rather super- fluous, but we will not oppose it as it is not in itself objectionable. 113. In the light of our opposition to the first amend- ment and our strong' objections to the manner in which the Organization is again handling this issue, we cannot accede to the usual consensus adoption of this draft reso- lution on the IAEA report should both amendments gain approval. In that case we will ask for a 'vote by the As- sembly and abstain on the final draft resolution as amended. 114. We hope to avoid such an unusual break in consen- sus. We urge other members to refrain from steps that would lead to such a break. I remind them once again that unfortunately the very next agenda item, today, in this very Assembly, provides ample opportunities to dis- cuss the exact topic of these amendments. 115. Breaking the consensus on this draft resolution would be a real disservice to the laudable IAEA and to its distinguished Director General, Mr. Eklund.

Resolutions on the item before us have traditionally and consistently been adopted by constmsus. In introducing its amendments Iraq must have been aware that it would break the common agreement on this item. It .has thus demonstrated its total disregard for international efforts to maintain consensus in an area of vital importance to the international community. 117. Iraq's amendments must be ·read together and in conjunction with the debate which opened this morning on agenda item 130. :rhey cannot be understood other- wise, for they are a clear attemp~ to introduce, for Iraq's own partisan purposes,. controverSial elements into what has always been a common position. In the process, Iraq is. 4~li~raJely poli~icizing the item before us by injecting its version of the Arab-Israel conflict. Iraq is thus follow- ing here the pattern set by it and by its supporters at the . 118. The amendments to draft resolution A/36/L.1O are discriminatory and arbitrary; they ignore the fact .that many Arab and other States have not complied, and have no intention of complying, with basic requirements of the IAEA statute and with their international obligations in the non-proliferation and aisarmament fields. 119. The amendments are totally incompatible with the draft resolution on the IAEA report. If adopted, they can only damage the IAEA and its relatioftship with the Gen- eral Assembly. They will certainly not contribute ~o the solution of the problems facing IAEA and its members. 120. Iraq's lack of good faith is also evidenced by the fact that its amendments were introduced half a day be- fore the General Assembly was about to discuss a sepa- rate item on the subject to which they refer, making them otiose and self-serving at best. 121. Israel therefore rejects the patent Iraqi attempts ~J politicize this item and will vote as appropriate on the Iraqi amendments. Should they be adopted, Israel will vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

Iraq would like to ask for a recorded vote on the amendments and on the draft reso- lution as a whole.

We shall now proceed to the vote. In accordance with rule 90, of the rules of pro- cedure of the General Assembly, we shall deal first with the amendments in document A/36/L.12. I put to the vote first the amendment in paragraph .1. A recorded vote has been requested.

Next I put to the vote the amendment in paragraph 2 of document A/36/L.12. A re- corded vote has been requested.

I now put to the vote draft reso- lution A/36/L.IO, as amended. A recorded vote has been requested.

I shall now call on those repre- sentatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote.

The delegation of Bolivia voted in favour of the amendments to draft resolution A/36/L.IO, but we do not consider that those amendments reallv fit in with the rest of the text, and we think it would have been preferable, for the sake -of consensus, to retain the original wording of the draft resolution.

The delegation of Fin- land voted in favour of draft resolution A/36/L.IO, just adopted, as it did for the amendments contained in docu M ment A/36/L.12. We regret, however, that, unlike in pre- vious years, this so-called omnibus resolution on the Agen~y could not be adopted by consensus. 129. We consider it essential to strengthen international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in which activity IAEA, in all of its functions. has a central role.' 130. In the light of the general discussion of the agenda - item before the Assembly, and despite the divergence just recorded in the vote, consensus does indeed continue to prevail on the essential and customaty provision!. concern- ing lAEA and its work.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community in explanation of our votes on the amendments in document A/36/L.12 and on draft res- olution A/36/L.IO. 132. While the Community voted in favour of the amendments in document A/36/L.12 and for draft resolu- tion A/36/L.IO, we regret that it was not possible to achieve consensus on that draft resolution dealing with the report of the Agency, which is traditionally an uncon- tentious item. We are not convinced that the 3mendments in document A/36/L.12, which are ofa political nature, find their proper place in draft resolution A/36/L.IO, which deals with what i~ primarily a report on the techni-

The Government of India has strongly condemned the unprovoked and unjustified attack by Israel on the Iraqi nuclear installations. The position of the Indian delegation in regard to this matter was fully stated when it was considered by the Security Council in June 198 I and by the Board of Governors and by the General Conference of IAEA at its twenty-fifth session later in the year. 134. In regard to the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/36/L. 10 that we have just adopted, I should like to reiterate the views of my Government, which are well known and have b::;en clarified in IAEA at the appropriate time. Even if Iraq had not been a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or not accepted safeguards, the blatant act of aggression by Israel would have been equally reprehensible and to- tally inadmissible.

Australia voted in favour of draft resolution A/36/L. 10, as well as for the two amendments submitted at the 5 Ist meeting and contained in document A/36/L. 12. The two amendments reflect views of the Australian Government which have already been expressed in other relevant bodies, in particular the IAEA General Conference in September and the Commit- tee on Disarmament in Geneva, where we joined a num- ber of other delegations in expressing Ol!r condemnation of the Israeli attack. 136. Military operations such as Israel's against the Iraqi reactor not only are detrimental to efforts to restore peace and stability in the region but are also harmful to the efforts of the international community to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons on "the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the associated safeguard sys- tems administered by IAEA. 137. The Australian delegation wishes to place on rec- ord, however, that such a reference has no place in the IAEA resolution, which is traditionally, and correctly, a resolution of a technical nature. It is a resolution designed as a vehicle for the General Assembly's endorsement of the Agency's role and activities in the preceding year. It should not be used for political point-scoring. We regret also that the introduction of a political element has had the effect of breaking the consensus that the IAEA resolu- tion has traditionally enjoyed.

Canada voted in favour of draft resolution A/36/L.IO, on the report of IAEA. in- cluding the amendments contained in document A/36/ L. 12. We regret that the draft resolution did not obtain consensus, as has been the aim and the practice in pre- vious years. \Ve are uneasy about the introduction of amendments referring to a politically contentious action, albeit one which we have previously condemned, into a traditionally procedural resolution dealing with the report of iAEA for 1980, particularly since this matter is already the subject of debate under the item on armed Israeli ag- gression against the Iraqi nuclear installations.

The delegation of Brazil voted in favour of draft resolution A/36/l..UO. on the re- port of IAEA. Nevertheless, we deem it fitting to place on record our reservations on the sixth preambular para-

in recent years the resolution approving the report of IAEA has been adopted by the General As- sembly by consensus. This consensus not only repre- sented a procedural mechanism for adopting decisions but reflected a political will for agreement, commitment and understanding. Delegations whidl had legitimate reasons to dissent from some statements contained in the report were prepared to go along with a consensus and not obstruct the adoption of a text whose importance was rec- ognized by all Member States. The delegation of Argen- tina considers most undesirable the mention of the Non- Proliferation Treaty, as well as some other expressions in the report which we do not consider correct as regards the proportion between the activities relating to technical as- sistance and the activities relating to safeguards in the Agency-that is to say, where the Agency is praised while it does not act in accordance with the provisions and regulations of its statute. 142. At this time, unfortunately, we face a different sit- uation from the usual one, and this is due to events and circumstances which we all know and condemn. We ear- nestly hope that this exceptional situation will not be re- peateo. In that regard, in voting in favour of the amend- ments in document A/36/L. 12, as well as draft resolution A/36/L.1O, we urge the Assembly to return to the path of consensus, which can only be the result of a process of negotiation, which may be arduous but is nevertheless fruitful. 143. We support the new operative paragraph 7 because we do not consider it to be admissible to carry out attacks against nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes. But at the same time, as my delegation has always main- tained, we object to specific references to Member States of the United Nations, since we believe this runs counter to the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Organization and the effectiveness .jf the relevant resolu- tions. 144. Thus our affirmative vote must be understood to be subject to the reservations we have clearly formulated.

I shall now call on those repre- sentatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. May I remind members that, in accoq.lance with General Assembly decision 34/40I, statements in exercise , of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to 5 minutes for the second and should be made by representatives from their seats.

My delegation supported draft resolution A/36/L. 10 and the amendments to it that were proposed. because we believe in the princi- ples that were incorporatf'~ in the draft and in the amend- ments-namely, we do condemn all acts of aggression against the territorial integrity of States, including the Is-

The amendments submit- ted by my delegation to the Assembly, unlike the alle- gations made today by the representative of the Zionist entity and the representative of its protect.or, the United States, were closely connected with the draft resolution and with the item under discussion. They were closely connected with the second, third, fourth, fifth and eighth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 3 and 5 of draft resolution A/36/L.IO. 14~;' If there have been attempts to politicize and de- stroy, they were not the amendments submitted by Iraq. The Iraqi amendments did .not destroy the draft resolution or IAEA; that is utter nonsense. If damage was done to IAEA, it was the unprecedented criminal attack of Israel on a safeguarded nuclear installation. This has been at- tested to by the Director General himself more than once-here and at the General Conference of the Agency itself and before its Board of Governors. 149. For the United States to say that it firmly opposes the first amendment is a retraction of the position it took in the Security Council on resolution 487 (1981). It is unfortunate that it should take such action at this stage. 150. To say that nothing has happened since those Se- curity Council deliberations is also not true. The matter was discussed at the General Conference of the Agency at Vienna and action was taken on the matter. It is only just and proper that the General Assembly should now follow up what went on in the General Conference of lAEA. 151 . They say that breaking the consensus is a disser- vice. We did not break the consensus. Israel, by its un- precedented action, its attack on IAEA and all that it stands for, broke the consensus. We should not, we can-

If any evidem~e was still re- quired to the effect that Iraq was indeed benl! on politiciz- ing the item which is before us, the representative of Iraq has just provided that evi~ence.,

With reference to subitem (b), I remind representatives that the vote on draft resolution A/36/L.11 will have to be postponed to give the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee an opportunity to consider the financial implications. We shall resume consideration of this item at a later date. . 155. I wish to announce that the following countries have become sponsors of draft resolution A/36/L.l1 : Chile, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria and Venezuela. NOTES I Ernest W. Lctcver. Nue/ear Arm.'i in the Third World. Washington. D.e.. The Brookings Institution. 1979. ~ See Official RL'clmls of the Sec:trity Cmmcil. Thirty-...ixth __ 2288th meeling. I IbM.. 2280lh and 2288th meelings. ~ Ibid.. Thirty-fiJilr Year. Supplel1lellt for January. febrt",ry and March 19XO. document S1I3816. ~ Ibid.. document S/13816. annex. par... 3. .. Ibid.. panl. 4. 7 Morlon A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Kalzenbach. The Political f'mmdation.'i l!l IlItemationaL La",. New York. lohn Wileyand Sons Inc.. 1961. pp. 212 and 213. K Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America: sce Uniled Nations. TrL'aty SL'ries. vo!. 634. No. 9068. p. 326. ~ See QlJicial ReCllrds of thL' General ASSL'l1Ibl.\~ Thirty-Jijih Se.">: ·fln. An"exes. agenda items 31 to 49 and 121. document A/35/680. pam. 6. III The deUegation of the Dominican Republic subS\..'quently infonllcd Ihe Secrelariat Ihat it had intended 10 abstain in the vote on the dmft resolulion. 11 See Internalional Atomic Energy Agency. Re.mlutitlll.\" (IIul Otlu'r Ded.\·iolls (y' the Gelleral Ccmjerellce. 1jl'f!Ilt,\':fijilr Regular Se.\·...illll. GC(XXV)/RES/388.