A/48/PV.46 General Assembly

On behalf of the United States, my delegation wishes to express its strong support for the draft resolution on the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1992. In carrying out its dual responsibility of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and guarding against its use for any military purposes, the IAEA, through the provision of safeguards, fosters international peace and security and is therefore an institution of critical importance to the United States and the international community. We commend Director General Blix and the IAEA secretariat for their demonstrated diligence and commitment in carrying out these responsibilities. The IAEA’s extensive, effective and unique system of safeguards provides the foundation of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The safeguards system provides important assurances that transfers of nuclear technology and information will not be diverted for military purposes and thereby undermine This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178, and incorporated in a copy of the record. NEW YORK international peace and stability. President Clinton, in his address to the General Assembly on 27 September, stated that non-proliferation was one of our nation’s highest priorities. He noted the role of the IAEA in this regime and called on the international community to continue supporting and strengthening the IAEA. The United States commends the IAEA and its Board of Governors for actions taken to strengthen its safeguards programme - especially in reaffirming its right to request special inspections for undeclared facilities; in requesting Member States to share intelligence data and to expand their reporting of nuclear imports, exports and design information; in establishing systems to better analyse these data; and in examining whether and how it might incorporate environmental monitoring techniques into safeguards practices. All these steps will increase the transparency of a Member State’s nuclear activities and should improve the IAEA’s ability to detect clandestine activities. I should now like to address the question of the IAEA’s role in dealing with specific countries and regions of non- proliferation concern. The United States strongly commends the IAEA for its efforts to implement safeguards in North Korea. Despite the Agency’s efforts, we are deeply concerned that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has not yet accepted IAEA inspections necessary to maintain the continuity of safeguards. As Director General Blix has stated, the longer these inspections are delayed, the more continuity of safeguards is threatened. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to accept these inspections as soon as possible and to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of their safeguards agreement. Distr. GENERAL A/48/PV.46 22 November 1993 ENGLISH The IAEA effort to find and destroy Iraq’s nuclear programme has been an impressive success. None the less, as Director General Blix has noted, there remain gaps in our knowledge of Iraq’s procurement channels and sources of scientific and technical information. Moreover, Iraq has not yet acknowledged its obligation, under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), to accept long-term monitoring and verification, nor has it demonstrated willingness to implement the requirements of the IAEA’s plan for long- term monitoring. Accordingly, we urge Iraq to take the steps required by the IAEA, under the terms of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991), and we support the IAEA’s intention to require full satisfaction on these issues before reporting to the Security Council that Iraq is in compliance with the relevant portions of these resolutions. We are witnessing historic breakthroughs in the peace process in the Middle East. The achievements in the bilateral talks open new possibilities for arms control and regional security. We hope that continued political progress between Israel and its neighbours will enhance possibilities to move forward towards the creation of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East and to limit the destabilizing build-up of conventional armaments in the region. The United States supports IAEA participation in these efforts, especially to assist regional discussions on effective verification of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In South Africa, we are pleased that the IAEA’s visits and inspections have been open and productive. We welcome the Agency’s efforts in confirming South Africa’s initial declaration of nuclear materials, and we commend the Government of South Africa for its extensive cooperation with Agency officials in carrying out their safeguards responsibilities. We also look forward to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in all of Africa. The United States welcomes the stabilizing effect of advances in safeguards in Latin America. We look forward I should now like to turn to several more general areas of non-proliferation interest, beginning with a cut-off of fissile material. The United States takes particular note of the Director General’s optimism that the present international climate is favourable towards universal agreement on a verified cut-off of the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for explosive purposes. My Government shares this optimism. President Clinton, in his address to the General Assembly, stated forcefully the commitment of the United States to press for an international agreement that would ban for ever the production of these materials for weapons purposes. Verification through IAEA safeguards will, of course, be absolutely essential to the credibility of such a regime. Furthermore, President Clinton proposed submission of United States fissile material no longer needed as a nuclear deterrent to inspection by the IAEA. We also note the proposals to involve the IAEA in the verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and shall consider them fully. We believe that consideration of the IAEA’s participation in disarmament activities beyond its traditional safeguards role is a tribute to the respect for it as an international institution that has developed. As the Director General pointed out in his statement, the added workload of verification - and the resources needed for it - will be significant. The United States believes that we need to take a serious look at mechanisms for providing what could be substantially increased resources for IAEA safeguards. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stands as the primary legal and political barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and reflects the international consensus that nuclear proliferation remains one of the gravest threats to global security and stability. The IAEA is closely linked to the Treaty, which relies on the IAEA safeguards system to monitor Parties’ compliance with its provisions. Efforts to strengthen these safeguards will also strengthen the NPT. It is through the IAEA that the United States is able to direct resources and other technical support to NPT Parties, in fulfilment of the provisions of Article IV of that Treaty, which calls for the fullest possible cooperation between Parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States believes that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995 will provide the greatest possible assurance that the Treaty’s contributions to global security and to the peaceful development of nuclear energy will endure. There are two other areas of concern that I would like to mention. First, in regard to the dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic Sea, the IAEA is developing an important role in the international evaluation of the effects on human health and the environment of radioactive waste dumped into the Arctic environment. The United States supports these efforts. Secondly, concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear power, the IAEA report for 1992 makes clear the extent of the Agency’s provision of technical assistance to the developing world. The IAEA has assisted countries in all aspects of the application of peaceful nuclear science and technology, from nuclear-power planning and development and waste management to assistance in non- nuclear-power technologies. This is an important role which my Government continues to support strongly, and we encourage other IAEA member States to do the same. On September 27, in his address to this body, President Clinton said that, as one of our nation’s highest priorities, we would weave non-proliferation Our strong support for the IAEA is a crucial part of this effort. The United States pledges to continue this support as an essential element of our overall United States non- proliferation efforts, including regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and a convention for the cut-off of fissile material production. Finally, my Government wishes to commend the IAEA for its invaluable contribution to international peace, security and welfare.

Let me start by saying that Finland, at present a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), very much appreciates the leadership that Director General Hans Blix is providing the Agency as it faces the While many issues on the Agency’s agenda merit our attention, I shall in this intervention concentrate on just three which my Government regards as the most important and urgent. These are: the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, the new tasks before the Agency in the context of nuclear disarmament, and the question of implementation of IAEA safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Turning to safeguards, Finland supports a thorough overhaul and modernization of the IAEA safeguards system. We are following with keen interest the development of new safeguards concepts. It is of fundamental importance that the Agency streamline its safeguards implementation and put in a more efficient and cost-effective safeguards performance. As we see it, improvement of the Agency’s safeguards system is one of the key questions during the period leading up to the 1995 non-proliferation Treaty review and extension conference. Greater reliance on national systems of accountancy and control, a partnership approach with regional organizations such as the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and intensification of the Agency’s efforts to detect undeclared nuclear activities are important steps in the right direction. However, the Agency and the United Nations face challenges that necessitate an even bolder approach. The IAEA must be ensured adequate financial and personnel resources for effective safeguards implementation. As possibilities for additional financial resources are scarce, the issue of differentiation in safeguards implementation must be addressed. The differences in risk posed by different nuclear facilities and programmes must be factored in when safeguards resources are allocated. Only thus can the available resources be utilized in a way that will meet the vital non-proliferation objective. The need to strengthen the credibility of safeguards is palpable. We are not advocating the role of a global nuclear policeman for the Agency, but we are convinced that it is not sufficient for it to continue as only a global nuclear bookkeeper. Bookkeeping is important, but safeguards implementation must be directed towards an approach that is less dependent on routine inspections and more focused on detecting possible non-routine activities. Finland has volunteered for the role of a trial country for new methods of safeguards implementation. We shall continue our support programme for safeguards implementation and gear it to streamlining such implementation. I shall now turn to the new tasks facing the Agency. The question of banning nuclear tests is closely related to the other non-proliferation tasks performed by the Agency. We see the IAEA as a natural and cost-effective umbrella organization for the implementation of the future comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Verification will be a central issue in negotiating the test ban. So are costs. Mandating the IAEA to act as the verification agency of the test-ban treaty would, in our opinion, be justified. To a large extent, the IAEA already has the concepts and the experience relevant to the task. The additional cost to the Agency would, in our view, be modest compared to the cost of setting up an entirely new international organization. Disarmament budgets are already strained by the cost of establishing the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons. Finland supports an international agreement on a ban on the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear-weapons purposes. The IAEA would, in our view, be ideally suited for the verification of such a cut-off and for the verification of weapons-grade material made redundant through the process of nuclear disarmament. While safeguards implementation and participation in disarming Iraq have put the IAEA to a demanding technical test, the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has put the Agency’s decision-making capacity and safeguards policy to an equally demanding political test. The credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty will not withstand indefinite non-compliance by a State party. Finland has favoured dialogue and urged negotiated compliance in regard to the special inspection of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We hope that the avenue of patience and dialogue will soon lead to the required results. We fully agree with the Director General that the only legal basis and guideline for the relations between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is to be found in the safeguards agreement and the non-proliferation Treaty. We strongly urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reconsider its position and comply with the obligations it entered into freely when concluding its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Finland remains committed to the purposes of the Agency as it contributes to the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have consistently

In a recent statement in the First Committee my delegation has discussed several of the issues mentioned here by other speakers. Today, I should like to detail the efforts of the Czech Republic to continue in and take up the commitments of Czechoslovakia with respect to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to mention some tasks which we feel lie ahead of my country. As members are aware, after 35 years of fruitful and active cooperation Czechoslovakia, one of the founding members of the IAEA, terminated its membership in the Agency owing to the country’s dissolution on 31 December 1992. From the very first moment of its existence, the Czech Republic has been interested in resuming IAEA membership, since it considers the Agency to be one of the most important and most highly respected of United Nations agencies, one that has contributed in a decisive way to the preservation of peace and understanding among nations by promoting international cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and by its control safeguards system targeted at nuclear non-proliferation. When submitting its application for membership to the IAEA at the beginning of this year the Czech Republic declared that it considers itself bound by all the Agency obligations and agreements to which Czechoslovakia had been a signatory. The Czech Republic acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), confirmed its succession to the Agreement between the IAEA and Czechoslovakia on the implementation of safeguards, became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, adopted the provisions of both parts of Information Circular (INFCIRC)/254 and, in the sense of the Zangger Committee decision, it is also a member of that body. Since its foundation on 1 January of this year the Czech Republic has continued to implement IAEA safeguards according to the Information Circular (INFCIRC)/153 model document. My country has simultaneously confirmed its succession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. We have accepted with satisfaction the positive recommendation of the Board of Governors concerning our membership in the IAEA, which was issued last February, as well as the decision of the thirty-seventh session of the General Conference of IAEA on 27 September last to The Czech Republic appreciates highly the IAEA efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. In particular, the follow-up to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty performed through the Agency’s safeguards system has proved that, in spite of certain drawbacks, the IAEA is irreplaceable. In this context we should like to commend especially the Agency’s recent monitoring activities in Iraq based on United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and its efforts to create conditions for concluding a safeguards agreement with, and consistent observation of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty by, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. I cannot express strongly enough our support for those measures. The Czech Republic intends to resume the tradition of good cooperation with the IAEA, not only by providing its own experts for its own monitoring activities, but also by granting lasting, active support to all positive efforts to enhance the strength and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system, enabling the system to cover growing requirements from its limited funds. I should like to assure members, in the name of the Czech Government, that the issue of the peaceful application of nuclear energy will remain in the limelight for the Czech Republic. One of the urgent tasks at hand is the drafting of nuclear legislation that would regulate problems insufficiently covered by our current legislation. These include nuclear-waste disposal, the end of the nuclear-fuel cycle, legal responsibility for nuclear damage, and associated insurance of nuclear-power-plant operators. In all fields we intend to continue to implement to the maximum degree the IAEA recommendations, attitudes and instruments so as to tackle the sensitive issues at the level of current international requirements and international practice. In the very near future the Czech Republic will address the issue of civil-law provisions with respect to responsibility for When dealing with problems associated with nuclear energy the Czech Republic intends to continue the good relations Czechoslovakia had with its neighbours. That is why my country has declared that it considers itself bound, without any reservations, by agreements concluded between Czechoslovakia and Austria, Germany and Hungary, respectively. The Czech Government has recently discussed a draft governmental agreement with the Slovak Republic on cooperation in the field of nuclear safety, and we have also been following attentively and giving our full support to the preparations for the international convention on nuclear safety. We appreciate the efforts of the IAEA devoted to the preparation of the concept, and we are convinced that adopting the convention will further enhance the international significance of the IAEA and contribute to global harmonization of basic requirements concerning nuclear safety. The Czech Republic fully realizes the importance of IAEA activities in the field of technical assistance and cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy for economic and social progress in developing countries. As a State with a well-developed nuclear programme, my country is ready to assist such countries by providing experts, accepting trainees, organizing training courses and coordinating research programmes. We are able to pay the full amount of this year’s voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund as well as our contribution to the Agency’s regular budget. The Czech delegation appreciates the activities of the IAEA in the period analysed in the report and highly values the self- sacrificing work of its secretariat, headed by Director General Hans Blix, as well as of the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors. Allow me to express the resolve of the Czech Republic to support the IAEA fully and actively in all spheres of its activity in the future.

The Bulgarian delegation would like to associate itself with the other delegations that have expressed great esteem and appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix and the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the competence and efficiency with which the important functions of the Agency are carried out. We are thankful to the Director-General for the annual report and for his comprehensive statement on the work of the IAEA. Under his leadership, 1992 became another successful year in which the tasks of the Agency have been undertaken in a way that inspires the confidence and gratitude of Member States. The annual report of the IAEA clearly demonstrates that the Agency has continued to fulfil its responsibilities as Nuclear non-proliferation issues and the Agency’s safeguards were at the forefront of international headlines throughout 1992. This year has seen the start of the process leading to the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. Bulgaria firmly believes that the non-proliferation Treaty, with its 160 States Parties, is the cornerstone of the whole non-proliferation structure. Central to the Treaty are Articles III and IV, dealing with safeguards and technical cooperation. The Treaty review and extension process will therefore interact with developments within the IAEA in these two areas. We favour the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty and believe that such an outcome would further strengthen global security and stability. It has been suggested that the Agency may have a role in the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. A world-wide cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would be another extremely important nuclear-arms control measure capable of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The Agency is perfectly qualified to be the monitoring organ for a cut-off agreement. A further task which has to be addressed by the Agency is the need for secure handling and storage of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads. All this underscores the ever-growing importance of the IAEA in the efforts to remove the threat of nuclear proliferation, which remains the greatest challenge. Confidence in the international non-proliferation regime can exist only when States are completely transparent with regard to their nuclear activities. Full cooperation with the IAEA, which administers the nuclear non-proliferation system on behalf of the international community, is essential. The right of the Agency to perform special inspections where necessary must be upheld. As a last resort, the backing of the Security Council may be needed. The safeguards system is a key element of the non-proliferation regime. Bulgaria has welcomed the close cooperation of South Africa with the IAEA that has led to transparency with regard to its past nuclear programme as well as its present nuclear activities. We call upon those States which have not yet done so to accede to the non- proliferation Treaty and to conclude and implement the required safeguards agreements with the Agency. In this context, we would like to express our deep concern with My delegation also believes that each Member State should strictly comply with Security Council resolutions and provide the requested information concerning its nuclear activities. We express our confidence in and full support of the Director General and his staff for their impartial and tireless efforts in the implementation of the responsibilities entrusted to the IAEA by the entire international community. Bulgaria is of the opinion that beyond the obligation of providing information on their nuclear programmes, Member States should supply the Agency with relevant information which may help the safeguards operations to become more effective. In this context, we support the establishment on a voluntary basis of a universal system of reporting to the Agency of the exports and imports of certain equipment and non-nuclear material commonly used in the nuclear industry. Thus, the necessary transparency in the nuclear activities of States will be provided, building confidence in their peaceful character. This will also reduce the risk of any violation taking place without being revealed in due time. The Bulgarian Government has established a national system of nuclear-related export controls which meets the new international requirements. We believe that this will greatly facilitate our participation in a future universal nuclear-related reporting system. We also support continuing efforts to strengthen nuclear dual-use export controls within the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the non- proliferation Treaty-based Zangger Committee. The IAEA activities related to safeguards, nuclear safety and technical assistance are all areas of high priority. Without prejudice to the first two, I would like to comment on the technical assistance provided to Bulgaria by the IAEA for the enhancement of the nuclear and radiation safety of the Kozloduy nuclear-power plant. The work carried out in the past three years on the reassessment of the site, its seismic characteristics included, in compliance with the IAEA standards, has been completed. The system for industrial seismic safety has been entirely upgraded. The necessary equipment has been furnished and a local network for seismic monitoring is being set up. The national regulatory authority has been helped in working out and codifying the documents on nuclear and radiation safety as well as in obtaining equipment for the mobile dosimetric laboratory of the Inspectorate on Radiation Safety. Valuable assistance has been given us by the Commission of the European Communities, the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the Consortium of Nuclear Energy Regulatory Bodies, which have worked out relative designs and performed scientific research and analyses. The financial aid given to us by the European Community, the World Bank and the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France has been of crucial importance. I would like to express the deep gratitude of the Bulgarian Government to the IAEA, the Commission of the European Communities, the other international institutions and the Governments of friendly States for their help, which has guaranteed the reliable and safe operation of our nuclear power-generating capacities in a time of hardship. Parallel to the efforts aimed at further improving the safety of our nuclear-power plants, we will continue to broaden the application of nuclear methods in other areas, agriculture and medicine in particular. We will rely on the assistance of the Agency in the implementation of specific projects in these areas. On its part, Bulgaria will do its best to contribute to the successful implementation of the Agency’s programmes for technical assistance and cooperation. During the reported period, a regional seminar on current testing of WWER-type reactors was held in Kozloduy. Bulgaria also hosted the Research Coordination Meeting (RCM) on the biological effect of hot particles from Chernobyl. In conclusion, allow me once again to express the high appreciation and unreserved support of the Bulgarian Government for the role and activities of the Agency aimed at promoting international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the efficient control over nuclear-weapons proliferation.

I should like to make an announcement concerning agenda item 56, namely, "Restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related fields". As the Assembly is aware, I have been conducting consultations in order to determine how best to continue the work started at previous sessions. I propose to establish an informal, open-ended working group to prepare a draft resolution on the restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related fields, with a view to bringing this matter to the Assembly for decision no later than the end of November 1993. I have requested the Permanent Representative of Benin to serve as chairman of this informal, open-ended working group, which should commence its work as soon as possible. With regard to agenda item 53, "Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly", I shall very shortly, in a day or two, make an announcement concerning the establishment of an open-ended working group with a view to carrying out the tasks set out in resolution 47/233 in order to seek a consensus text before the conclusion of the current session. Finally, after the General Assembly has concluded its debate - scheduled for 23 November - on agenda item 33, "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council", I shall make a further announcement concerning the establishment of another open- ended working group to deal specifically with this issue. In each of these cases, I intend to be actively involved in order to help ensure that the Assembly’s expectations in the area of reform, restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations and its organs are fully satisfied.

The delegation of Nigeria has carefully read the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1992, contained in document GC(XXXVII)/1060, and thanks the Director General for his comprehensive statement highlighting the progress made in the activities of the Agency during the year Nigeria attaches great importance to international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy, and has followed with close interest the role of the Agency in promoting the transfer and dissemination of nuclear techniques in agriculture, industry and medicine. In this connection, we note with satisfaction the progress that was made in the course of the year in expanding the Agency’s technical assistance programmes in developing countries. The development at the Agency’s Seibersdorf laboratories of new crop varieties with superior yields, qualities and disease resistance through mutation breeding, and under soil and climatic conditions that prevail in some developing countries; the use of nuclear and nuclear-related technologies to diagnose rinderpest diseases; renewed efforts towards the eradication of tsetse fly using the sterile male technique; the use of irradiation for sterilizing medical products and their improvement by polymerization; and the use of nuclear techniques for trace element analysis of air, water, soil and biological samples to improve knowledge about movements of air pollutants - these are only a few of the important research efforts whose widespread dissemination would be beneficial to developing countries. We commend the new orientation in the biennial technical assistance programme and believe that it would enhance national development as well as regional cooperation. The Nigerian delegation notes with satisfaction that Africa’s share in the total approved programme has continued to rise over the past years and is now the largest of any region’s. The Agency’s cooperation in the transfer of nuclear science and technology to Africa through the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) has always been valued by my country. The increase in the number of projects identified for funding in the region attests to the value that African member States attach to the Agency’s contribution to our development. We urge the international community to maintain its commitment to AFRA by providing the requisite level of resources to facilitate the speedy execution of those projects. It is noteworthy that the Agency’s stepped-up activities in the area of technical cooperation coincide with a growing awareness that an appropriate balance needs to be struck The role of the Agency in the area of safeguards, as spelt out in its statute, has never been more pronounced. Recent developments have revealed the limitations in the safeguards system and in the Agency’s capability to meet fully its obligations under safeguards agreements with member States and pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The difficulties experienced by the Agency in that process has stimulated discussion between member States and has resulted in the approval by the Board of Governors of a number of measures to strengthen the safeguards system. These are: the confirmation of the Agency’s right to special inspections; early provision and use of design information; monitoring of trade in nuclear materials and specified equipment, and in non-nuclear materials; and improvement in the Agency’s information base, along with its more critical use. We welcome these steps, and shall continue to follow closely any additional steps towards agreement on new approaches that would make the safeguards system more efficient and cost-effective. It is essential that the Agency continue to receive unqualified political support and cooperation in the implementation of safeguards agreements with member States. Commitments by all member States to abide by their obligations under such agreements are indispensable if the Agency is to maintain a credible verification system. As the nuclear-disarmament process gains momentum, and all States involved agree on proposals for a verified cut- off in production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons or for other explosive purposes, the Agency’s role as a credible verification mechanism for the peaceful use of nuclear material and installations will be more important. Possible applications of safeguards in a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and agreement on a complete test ban and an agreement on an international regime for the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium would all impose new challenges and require new techniques for safeguards verification. So far, the existing verification mechanism has been successfully invoked in South Africa to confirm the dismantlement of that country’s erstwhile nuclear-weapons programme as well as its compliance with obligations This development has provided an important impetus to the efforts of countries in our region to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. The formal adoption of the Treaty establishing that zone, the draft of which was agreed to at the meeting of the Group of Experts in Harare, Zimbabwe, in April 1993, will ensure Africa’s total commitment to non-proliferation. It is the expectation of the Nigerian delegation that the Agency and the international community will maintain their level of support for these efforts. In the long term, it is essential that the Agency’s experiences serve as a basis for broadening international transparency in compliance with safeguards agreements. It is most reassuring to the Nigerian delegation that the Agency has reviewed the environmental content of its programme of activities pursuant to Agenda 21. In cooperation with two other Vienna-based organizations, namely, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the Agency is carefully studying the problems and challenges of electric-power generation in relation to the environment. We also note that the Agency’s programmes in radiation protection, nuclear techniques in environmental conservation, and water resource and utilization have been intensified as part of continuing efforts to strengthen environmental awareness of the non-power use of nuclear energy. It is desirable to maintain this interest. In addition, there should be sustained efforts to combat a major residual problem of the nuclear industry: the disposal of nuclear and radioactive wastes. We urge the Agency to continue to provide Member States assistance in the area of handling, processing and disposal of radioactive waste. It should also strengthen its radioactive waste management programme. Nigeria shares the widespread concern over the safety of nuclear installations. Our delegation, therefore, notes with satisfaction from the report that those concerns have stimulated research on and the development and application of advanced technologies. The benefits of those efforts are already being enjoyed in a number of Member States, where a nuclear-safety culture seems to be growing. We welcome the significant progress made in the draft of a new nuclear safety convention following discussions by a working group of legal and technical experts in Vienna. Together with proposed amendments to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Protocol linking it to the Paris Convention, such a nuclear safety convention would be important for an international legal framework Like other international organizations, the International Atomic Energy Agency must adapt itself to the political realities of our time. Since 1978 Nigeria has joined other countries, particularly those of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, in pressing for the correction of the imbalance in representation of the two areas on the Board of Governors. Arguments in favour of such a step are as compelling as ever. It is our hope that Member States will engage in fruitful dialogue so that a solution based on the principles of equity and balance can be urgently reached. In conclusion, the delegation of Nigeria considers that the Agency has in the past year performed remarkably well the functions assigned to it under the Statute. By so doing, it has won our respect and confidence. We believe the Agency will be better able to meet the challenges ahead if it continues to receive the unflinching support of all its members.

I should like to begin by conveying, on behalf of the Pakistan delegation, our sincere felicitations to Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his comprehensive and informative statement on the activities of the Agency for 1992. Mr. Blix and his colleagues are to be commended for the dedication with which they are working to achieve the objectives and to fulfil the responsibilities of the Agency. We in Pakistan especially value our close cooperation with the IAEA and have benefited greatly from our useful consultations with Mr. Blix, whose advice and assistance have always been constructive and positive. Before giving our views on the substantive issues, I would like to commend the Agency for the marked improvement in the presentation of the annual report for 1992. Each chapter is now preceded by a helpful overview which summarizes the main points presented in the chapter. The new format of the annual report is based on recommendations made by the Member States and is indicative of the Agency’s responsiveness to the suggestions of Member States. Pakistan greatly appreciates the valuable technical cooperation that the Agency extends to Member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Among the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the generation of nuclear power is the most significant activity. The negative consequences of generating electricity by conventional means, especially fossil fuels, are becoming increasingly apparent. More than 6 billion tonnes of carbon are dumped in the atmosphere Nuclear power is cost-effective and, if generated in accordance with international safety standards, can be an environmentally sound option. It is not surprising, therefore, that requests from developing Member States for the Agency’s assistance in the field of nuclear-power generation are increasing. However, there are two major impediments to the introduction of nuclear power in the developing countries: it is capital-intensive and technologically demanding. These aspects need to be addressed by the Agency. Otherwise, the present unfortunate situation, with just 5 per cent of the world’s nuclear capacity located in the developing countries, will persist. The Agency should give particular attention to the developing Member States’ requests for more comprehensive assistance through an integrated package approach in nuclear-power-programme planning. Also, more detailed studies in regard to other applications of nuclear heat - for example, for chemical processes and water desalination - could be undertaken by the Agency. The safety services provided by the Agency deserve appreciation. Pakistan has benefited from many of the safety-related services provided by the Agency, such as the missions of the lnternational Nuclear Event Scale, the Operational Safety Review Team and the Assessment of Safety Significant Event Team. The scope of these activities should continue to be extended. In this regard, the Agency could play a more active role in promoting the sharing of experience and the transfer of safety-related information to developing countries with old reactors, as it has been doing for countries operating older reactors of Russian design. Pakistan also favours the adoption of international agreements on nuclear safety. We believe that a rational, equitable and non-discriminatory regime covering the various aspects of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be evolved. The Agency’s promotional activities relating to radioisotope applications in food and agriculture, health, industry and Earth sciences are praiseworthy. However, we are concerned at the fact that many research projects and training courses in these fields have been affected by budgetary cuts. The programmes most seriously affected by the cuts were, unfortunately, in the areas of the greatest interest to developing countries. The budgetary problems of the Agency deserve serious attention. A shortfall in the payment of assessed contributions to the regular budget has resulted in a 13 per cent cut applied to all departments and a deferral of programmes equivalent to about $16.2 million. We would Pakistan has always adhered to, and will continue to lend its fullest support to, the Agency’s safeguards. Pakistan remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We have put forward a series of proposals to keep the South Asian region free from nuclear weapons. These include the simultaneous signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the simultaneous acceptance of full-scope safeguards, mutual verification of nuclear facilities, a bilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty, and a bilateral declaration of adherence to non-proliferation. We hope those proposals will evoke a positive response. We are also willing to consider any other proposals that would ensure non-proliferation in South Asia on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis. Pakistan welcomes the positive movement towards nuclear non-proliferation in Africa and Latin America. The IAEA has played an essential role in fostering the progress towards non-proliferation in those regions. We express the hope that it will soon become possible similarly to welcome progress towards non-proliferation in the Middle East, North- East Asia and South Asia. While the Agency’s regulatory functions, including its work in the area of safeguards, are of great importance, the imposition of arbitrary or ill-conceived restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is most disturbing, especially when it is evident that there are no proliferation dangers involved. Regrettably, even safety-related information is at times refused. Such an approach is short-sighted and self-defeating. Countries that are prevented from having legitimate access to peaceful nuclear technology are then usually compelled to develop their own methods and techniques. These could possibly be less safe and would definitely be less open. Conversely, international cooperation would result in the evolution of safer techniques and methods as well as in greater openness and transparency. The Agency has a key role to play in this area. It can facilitate the unhindered flow of peaceful nuclear technology by enhancing its promotional activities and then by maintaining a proper balance between those activities and its regulatory functions. In conclusion, we would like to express our appreciation for the valuable technical cooperation that the Agency extends to member States. We hope that this cooperation will increase in quantity and will be further

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea, I would like to express our appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and his staff in the secretariat for their dedicated efforts and their achievements in the various activities of the IAEA during the past 12 months. My delegation sincerely welcomes Mr. Blix’s reappointment as Director General. As he takes on the new challenges of his well-deserved fourth consecutive term, we assure him of our continued support and cooperation. In an era of post-cold-war challenges, the reinforcement of a global non-proliferation regime continues to be an essential requirement in shaping a new world order of peace and security. Over the past year the international community has substantially increased its awareness of the vital importance of an effective global nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards at its core. The recent expansion of the NPT’s membership to 160 States, including all nuclear-weapon States, is a welcome development. We commend South Africa’s voluntary abdication of its nuclear-weapon status, an unprecedented act which sets a strong example for other States. We also welcome the enhanced prospects in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions and the newly strengthened momentum in the nuclear disarmament area. We earnestly hope that the international community can build upon these positive developments and carry out constructive discussions leading to the extension of the NPT beyond 1995. New problems, however, have arisen which present serious challenges to the NPT regime and its safeguards system. The non-compliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its NPT safeguards obligations and its threat to withdraw from the NPT, the experience of dealing with Iraq’s nuclear-weapons programmes, and the uncertainty of the presence of nuclear weapons in some States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are cases requiring the renewed efforts of the international community toward the strengthening of the NPT regime and its safeguards system. Given the pivotal role of the IAEA safeguards system in ensuring an effective NPT regime, my delegation would like to reiterate its full support for the safeguards activities In that connection, my delegation welcomes in particular the outcome of the re-examination of the Agency’s safeguards implementation, through the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, as a significant contribution to the strengthening of the safeguards system. The various recommendations of the Group, especially those relating to alternative safeguards approaches, including new measures to enhance the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities, can serve as a sound basis upon which the Agency can continue its work. We encourage the Agency to intensify its efforts for the early implementation of those recommendations, with special emphasis on securing greater confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my Government’s commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We believe that it is impossible to reduce tension and build peace in this area unless complete nuclear transparency is achieved there. In this regard, my delegation expresses its grave concern over the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, while refusing the Agency’s special inspections on its undeclared sites to resolve the issue of inconsistencies, has recently gone so far as to attempt restricting even normal ad hoc and routine inspections on its declared nuclear facilities. Because of that refusal by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the continuity of safeguards and the validity of earlier inspections data are now in jeopardy, and the scope of the noncompliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its Treaty obligations is being widened. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which has announced the suspension of its earlier intention to withdraw from the NPT, remains fully bound by the provisions of the Treaty and the safeguards agreement entered into with the IAEA. If we allow any party to the safeguards agreement to remain in non-compliance with its obligations and allow it to tell the inspectors what to see and what not to see or to set conditions alien to the provisions of the safeguards agreement, the credibility and validity of the entire safeguards system will not be sustained. Given the serious implications of this matter for international peace and security, my delegation believes that the General Assembly should address the issue firmly by sending an unequivocal message to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, urging it to cooperate with the IAEA and to implement without further delay its treaty obligations in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Board of While appreciating the IAEA’s continued impartial efforts toward the resolution of the issue, I should like to take this opportunity to request all the States Members of the United Nations to render their full cooperation in persuading the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that clearing itself of all nuclear suspicions and becoming a respectable and responsible member of the international community is in its own interest as well as that of the international community. In my Government’s view, the early implementation of the South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is also essential for the ultimate removal of suspicions about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme. A credible and effective regime of mutual inspections between the South and the North must be established as soon as possible. Once agreed upon and operational, this regime would serve to complement IAEA safeguards and contribute substantially to international non-proliferation efforts. In this regard, my Government would like to express again its earnest hope that the current South-North contacts will lead to a meaningful dialogue that will in turn produce an agreement on the establishment of an effective mutual-inspection regime at an early date. I should now like to turn to the issue of the international management of surplus fissionable materials and the possible role of the Agency in the area of nuclear disarmament. My Government remains deeply concerned about the surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium that will continue to result from the dismantling of nuclear warheads and from the growing commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. We strongly support the early establishment of a regime on international storage and management of surplus fissionable materials and encourage the Agency to take a leading role in ensuring that this is done. My delegation also notes with great interest the discussions on the possibility of extending the range of IAEA safeguards activities to assist in the activities for the verification of a complete test ban and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We believe that in this capacity the Agency could The promotional activities of the Agency are also important as, under the statute, they constitute one of its main areas of activity. We continue to support the strengthening of the Agency’s technical-assistance and cooperation programmes, particularly to meet the global goal of the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses to developing countries. In this regard, we look forward to increased efforts to secure predictable and assured resources for these programmes. We highly appreciate the Agency’s contributions in the promotion of international cooperation in the field of nuclear safety. We especially note its efforts to improve the safety of nuclear installations in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, as well as its activities in drawing up safety principles for future nuclear-power plants. We also look forward to early finalization of ongoing discussions on the draft of the international nuclear-safety convention. We earnestly hope that the convention will be adopted at a diplomatic conference early next year with the participation of the greatest possible number of countries. With regard to the management of radioactive waste, we appreciate the establishment of the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards (RADWASS) programme, which seeks to provide member States with guidelines for the safe management of radioactive wastes. The high priority placed by my Government on nuclear-waste management is reflected in its voluntary contributions to the IAEA in support of the RADWASS programme. We hope that the ongoing work on safety fundamentals will eventually lead to a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste. Another area of serious concern for my delegation is the disposal of radioactive waste in the sea. It is regrettable that, despite the moratorium recommended by the contracting parties to the London Dumping Convention, sea dumping of radioactive materials is still taking place. Given the importance of this matter, we call upon the IAEA and other relevant international organizations to take necessary initiatives for the environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes. In closing, my delegation wishes to reiterate the importance my Government attaches to the IAEA and to express its firm commitment to the Agency’s objectives and its support for the IAEA’s essential role in the promotion of

The report submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session contains important information concerning that organization’s multifaceted activities in 1992. In the period under review the IAEA was operating against the background of a rapidly changing world, the emergence of new members of the international community and the development of a new model of relations between States. The role of the IAEA in the modern world and the challenges that the Agency is facing are duly reflected in the statement of the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, before the General Assembly. I should like to take this opportunity to extend to Mr. Blix, on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation, sincere congratulations on his reappointment to that high office. The delegation of Ukraine notes with satisfaction that the Agency continues to make considerable efforts in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this regard, I should like to point out that Ukraine has, de facto, embarked on the path of gaining non-nuclear status and has consistently been taking steps to attain this goal. On 2 July 1993 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the country’s main guidelines for foreign policy. In those guidelines it was stated that Ukraine would never sanction the use of nuclear weapons from its territory, and that nuclear threat was excluded from its foreign policy. The withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine has been completed, and the process of dismantling strategic nuclear weapons has begun. However, our country cannot automatically obtain non-- nuclear status. Ukraine is the owner of the components of the nuclear weapons located on its territory, including both strategic and tactical ones, even though the latter were withdrawn to Russia for dismantlement and elimination in 1992. Until the nuclear weapons have been destroyed, it will be quite difficult to define the legal status of Ukraine as a classically nuclear or non-nuclear State. At the same time, Ukraine’s right to possess nuclear weapons does not contradict its aspiration to achieve non-nuclear status in the future, as well as respective provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. The decision about the future destiny of the strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine will be taken by its Parliament, which is now considering the issue of ratification of START and accession to the NPT. No doubt this decision will depend The delegation of Ukraine would like to stress that the elimination of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time will require considerable investments and expertise. In this connection, I would like to express appreciation for the multilateral and bilateral efforts to help Ukraine in achieving this goal. At the same time, however, we have to admit that the scope of international assistance in the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine is still far from sufficient. We commend the Agency’s safeguard activities, which are gaining particular importance in view of the ongoing nuclear disarmament process, and we support the Agency’s efforts to further implement the system of comprehensive safeguards. As was reiterated at the thirty-seventh regular session of the IAEA General Conference, Ukraine is ready to put all of its nuclear power plants and the research reactor under IAEA control. This process has already begun. Inspectors from the Agency’s Department of Safeguards visited all the announced facilities, providing their valuable support for our activities in regard to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. On 22 September 1993, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine registered the Rules of the State System for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control. It allows us to exercise government control over the registered quantity of all nuclear materials used in the peaceful nuclear activity of Ukraine. We are continuing to work on the development of the nuclear export-import control system. The first step in this direction is the establishment of the State Committee for export control. One of its main tasks is to monitor compliance with the norms of international law, with a view to ensuring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery. Another important step in this regard was the ratification by the Parliament of Ukraine of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Nuclear energy plays an important role in our economy. Suffice it to say that the operating nuclear power stations account for more than 30 per cent of the total amount of electric power produced in Ukraine. Under the difficult economic situation of the transition period, nuclear energy becomes vital and indispensable, since Ukraine cannot afford to buy the necessary amount of oil from the traditional sources because of the skyrocketing increase in the price of We commend the progress reached in the elaboration of a nuclear safety convention and new basic safety standards, and we express our conviction that this work will be completed in 1994. Ukraine supports the elaboration of a nuclear damage liability regime and intends to become a party to this regime. We welcome the Agency’s substantial advancement in the development of a programme relating to standards for the management of radioactive waste. As a sponsor of draft resolution A/48/L.13, the delegation of Ukraine is confident that the adoption of this resolution will contribute to the promotion of IAEA activities in fields that are of great importance for the international community. Once the comprehensive global nuclear safety system is established and nuclear weapons totally destroyed, the nations of the world will be able to use this, so far the most powerful, source of energy yet developed, exclusively for their economic development and a better life for all.

The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1992 and the statement made by Mr. Hans Blix on the Agency’s activities in 1993 give us a reassuring image of the positive role played by the IAEA in the development of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of its contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy continue to be faced with serious challenges. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has become more complex and the requirements of the IAEA safeguards system have increased. At the same time, a greater awareness of the present challenges in the area of nuclear safety is making itself felt in the minds of all. Recently, the IAEA has been faced with growing responsibilities, despite a number of difficulties, including budgetary constraints. We wish to pay a tribute to the Director General of the Agency, as well as to its secretariat, for the way in which The Romanian Government is grateful to the Agency and its member States for the various forms of assistance they have provided. For our programme on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, supported by such high-level technology as the Canadian deuterium-uranium (CANDU) reactors, perfectly transparent international cooperation is essential. An important contract signed last year with partners from Canada and Italy for one of our most important energy goals - the Cernavoda nuclear power plant - is at an advanced stage. We give high priority to the Agency’s activities in applying safeguards to the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Thus, my Government subscribes to the guidelines of the Nuclear Supplier Group and to those relating to the transfer of nuclear technologies and materials, including those with a dual use. As a former member of the Board of Governors of the Agency, and Vice-Chairman until September this year, Romania has supported the strengthening of the safeguards system and the extension of its technical assistance and cooperation activities. We also welcome the decisions and measures adopted in this regard. In our opinion, the recent reaffirmation by the Board of Governors of the IAEA’s right to conduct special inspections was particularly important. The proposal of the European Community to establish, on a voluntary basis, a register of the production and transfer of nuclear materials and equipment deserves, in this context, the full attention of member States. Furthermore, the need to strengthen the international non- proliferation regime has been amply demonstrated in the cases of Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In this regard it is necessary to ensure strict respect with full transparency, for commitments undertaken. The universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its unconditional and indefinite extension, the strengthening of the safeguards system and respect for the bilateral inspection arrangements agreed upon between States and the IAEA, will provide the indispensable, long-term foundation for international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear power. In a world which needs energy, and which is at the same time concerned about the risks of environmental deterioration, high priority must be given to nuclear safety and radiation protection in the programmes of the Agency. The expanded nuclear safety programme, which was adopted after the Chernobyl accident, has had positive effects on the scientific and technological plans of countries, and on the credibility of nuclear energy in the eyes of the public. Drafting an international convention on nuclear safety is of particular urgency. The Romanian Government wishes to reaffirm its determination to complete the Cernavoda nuclear power plant while strictly complying with international safety standards. Last year my country ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. Draft resolution A/48/L.13, sponsored by a large number of countries, including my own, reflects in an adequate, responsible and balanced manner the state of affairs in the very responsible area of activity of the IAEA. Recent challenges, and especially future challenges for the Agency and its member States, are to be found in this carefully negotiated and drafted document. We hope that it will be adopted by consensus. In conclusion, I repeat my Government’s determination to give its full support to the activities of the Agency in order to ensure that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes and that the nuclear non-proliferation regime functions in a manner commensurate with present and future requirements. The IAEA deserves the appreciation and support of the entire international community.

The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presented for consideration at this session of the General Assembly and the statement by the Director General of the Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, to which our delegation listened with great attention and interest, testify to the importance and the significant amount of work of the IAEA in various areas, primarily in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and ensuring the effectiveness of the safeguards system. Undoubtedly in so doing the Agency is making a significant contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which means a contribution to the cause of strengthening international peace and security. Like other Member States of the United Nations, we welcome and commend the activities of the Agency in those areas and consider them to be very timely. As has already been mentioned in interventions by the Belarusian delegation in this Hall, in February this year the Parliament of Belarus adopted the decision to adhere, as a non-nuclear State, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In July the Depositary Governments were We have begun preparatory work to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA. This work is proceeding at a normal pace, although even at this stage it is becoming clear that we will need assistance in the expeditious preparation and training of specialists, whose activities are directly related to carrying out the agreements. We shall also need the relevant equipment. Having become a fully fledged Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Belarus intends actively to participate in preparations for the 1995 Review Conference and with other States will work towards making the Treaty universal and with no time limit. The Republic of Belarus also favours the beginning of multilateral negotiations to draft the relevant documents on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on ending the production of fissile material for military purposes. Clearly, the time is ripe and it is now necessary to draft a multilateral document containing a single formula to guarantee the safety of non-nuclear States vis-à-vis the nuclear States. We fully understand the Agency’s efforts to ensure nuclear safety. We feel that, on the subject of promoting the development of nuclear power, the Agency should clearly point out the potential for accidents and the possible consequences, and if necessary should make provision to provide effective assistance to States that have suffered accidents. This is especially true since the resolution of the problems of the safe use of nuclear power plants, which is a responsible task, goes far beyond national boundaries, and should be under the full control of the Agency. Our Republic, surrounded by a chain of nuclear power plants located on the territories of other States bordering Belarus, has a special stake in the completion of the new initiatives of the IAEA which are intended to ensure the safe functioning of nuclear reactors in the States of Central and Eastern Europe, and on the territory of the former USSR. Belarus supports the activities of the Agency to complete the review of basic safety standards in radiation protection. The adoption of a new version of these standards is very timely for our Republic in the light of the corrections now being made in Belarus’s governmental programme to minimize the consequences of Chernobyl. The Chernobyl disaster has left an indelible mark on all aspects of the life of the Belarusian people. Its consequences determine to a large extent the sociological, Solving the unprecedentedly complex problems caused by the Chernobyl disaster remains a central task of our Government. The Parliament and Government of the Republic are making great efforts to provide normal living conditions for people in the affected regions. National efforts to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster are undoubtedly more effective when they are supplemented with international measures. An eloquent example of such cooperation is the joint project of the IAEA and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, with the participation of Norway, to lower the level of contamination of the milk and flesh of grazing animals through the use of substances that bind radioactive caesium. Use of the methods recommended in that project has produced very positive results: the level of radioactive caesium in milk and meat has dropped by between a half and three quarters. This is especially important in that these are among the main food products in Belarus. While we are sincerely grateful to everyone for the help that we have received, it is unfortunate that there is still a tendency for interest in the question of Chernobyl to decline, despite the demonstrated need for increased international efforts with regard to this problem. Our conviction is based on the deteriorating health of thousands of our fellow-citizens - primarily children. It is undeniable that international aid for the people of the affected regions produces a return in the form of knowledge in areas of such colossal human interest as the internal and external effects of small doses of radiation on humans and the effects of such radiation levels on the environment. In our opinion, the IAEA has an extremely important role to play in this sphere.

It is a unanimous aspiration of humankind to live in a world free of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Now that the East-West confrontation of the cold-war era has ended and peoples’ common aspiration to build a world free of aggression and war is growing, the elimination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war are a pressing issue that brooks no further delay. Reflecting this aspiration of the world’s peace-loving peoples, and proceeding from its desire to see the Korean peninsula denuclearized, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and ratified the Safeguards Agreement, and is faithfully discharging its obligations in this regard. Throughout eight rounds of ad hoc inspections, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea demonstrated complete sincerity in acceding to the requests of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It even subjected to inspection what were referred to as "suspicious sites". However, some officials of the IAEA’s secretariat, disregarding our sincerity, imposed a special inspection on the country, which they unreasonably charged with failure to comply with the Safeguards Agreement. This unjust action on the part of the IAEA has forced us to the conclusion that, contrary to our expectation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not conducive to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but, rather, is being used as a tool by those who want to destroy our socialist system. The IAEA’s action has also compelled the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in defence of its paramount interests, to take a decisive step towards withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite this decision, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expressed the hope that the issue would be resolved through negotiations and dialogue, that the aspirations of the world’s peace-loving peoples would thus be met. Consequently, the country’s Government proposed direct talks with the United States of America with a view to resolution of the nuclear issue, which had been politicized. Two rounds of talks were held. As a result of the publication of the Joint Statement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America, it is well known that the United States gave an assurance that it would not use, or threaten to use, At the same time, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea gave a commitment that it would unilaterally suspend implementation of its withdrawal from the NPT and would replace its graphite moderated reactors with light-water moderated reactors. Thus it demonstrated the transparency and sincerity of its denuclearization policy - renunciation of the development of nuclear weapons, about which the United States and other countries are so concerned; and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was our expectation that, with honouring of the commitments that had been entered into by both sides, the prospect of a fundamental and final solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula would be opened up; the foundations for improved relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America laid; the tensions in the Peninsula eased; and epoch-making progress towards achieving peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world made. However, during the course of the talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States and of the negotiations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the IAEA, some countries that adhere to the old thinking of the cold-war era revived the means of applying pressure, put the "nuclear issue" on the agenda for the thirty-seventh session of the General Conference of the IAEA, and secured the adoption of a so-called resolution. And now, they are trying to secure the adoption of a so- called resolution on the "nuclear issue" again at this meeting to consider the agenda item on the report of the IAEA. This is a political conspiracy to prevent the issue from being resolved through negotiations and to stifle the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The "nuclear issue" is not one to be included in a resolution of the United Nations; its inclusion is itself unreasonable. That is because the origination of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and its complexity have to do with the United States. The complicated relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the IAEA is also attributable to the partiality and "double standard" imposed by some officials of the IAEA secretariat. They turned away from Nevertheless, the attempt to adopt a resolution that commends the Director General and the secretariat of the IAEA, while ignoring our sincere efforts and the circumstances that compelled the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take a determined decision to withdraw from the non-proliferation Treaty, is an absolutely unjust act in view of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regards such a "resolution" as an insidious political offensive aimed at international pressure and categorically rejects it. It is being claimed that the attempt to adopt a resolution at this session, following upon the adoption of the so-called resolution at the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA, is a reflection of the "will of the international community". However, it is nothing but a pretext to cover up the political ambition of a few countries under the name of the international community. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will never recognize such a "demand" designed to trample upon the sovereignty of other countries and nations. We hold that this sacred forum, where peace-loving, independent and sovereign States meet to discuss ways and means for accomplishing the noble aspirations of mankind, should never be used as a political tool for a few countries to stifle the small and weak countries. The world’s people, who love justice and peace, earnestly hope that the United Nations will be a forum not to foster aggression and interference but to contribute towards the realization of their desire to build a new world, one that is peaceful and amicable. My delegation believes that the representatives will have a correct understanding of the serious political and military character of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and will cooperate towards its impartial and fundamental solution, thereby contributing to realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, removing tensions and ensuring peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world. The lesson we have learned after all our efforts to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula proves that talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States are the only way to resolve the issue, Because of their unfair acts, the IAEA secretariat and the Board of Governors are no longer qualified to deal with our "nuclear issue". The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as a member of international society, respects the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it is our unswerving intention faithfully to implement our country’s obligations under it. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will continue to leave the door open for negotiations and dialogue aimed at solving fairly the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula, and it will make a consistent effort towards that end. However, if an attempt is made to resolve the issue by resorting to any "pressure" or by the adoption of a "resolution" aimed at achieving a political purpose, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will act according to its own faith and decision. Now I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our position in connection with the remarks made by a number of representatives, including Australia and Hungary, about the widening of the area of non-compliance and about compliance with the Safeguards Agreement. Because of the nuclear threat of the United States against my country and the unjustified acts of some officials of the IAEA secretariat, a so-called nuclear suspicion was created, even though the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea faithfully complied with the Safeguards Agreement. The United States has responded to the talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since it has recognized the partiality and limitations of the IAEA and the fact that the United States is the party directly concerned in the resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. The Joint Statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America, issued on 11 June 1993, affirmed political commitments, such as respect for sovereignty, assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as impartial application of full-scope safeguards. A temporary suspension of the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been taken on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in the unique situation in which the talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States were going on. Insistence on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations under such circumstances, while the reason for withdrawal from the Treaty has not been solved, would be to force upon us the partial inspection by the Agency. It is thus clear to everyone that there is no legal ground for imposing such a demand. Those concerned The Japanese representative made a provocative remark against my country, in speaking about the implementation of international obligations. But his statement is only a poor excuse to conceal his country’s political ambition. The world’s peace-loving people know very well that Japan is making capital out of our "nuclear issue", which is unfounded, and pursuing a policy of military power and nuclearization behind a screen. Japan is storing up large amounts of plutonium under the pretext of securing nuclear fuel, in order to cover up its real purpose. Japan should not resort to the silly play of fishing in troubled waters, using our "nuclear issue", and should not create obstacles on the way to the resolution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. The south Korean authorities are making desperate efforts against their fellow-countrymen, showing that they have neither the will to solve the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula nor the will to realize reunification. The real purpose of the south Korean authorities in talking about the nuclear issue is to develop and possess their nuclear weapons behind the scenes and to have an excuse for frustrating the implementation of a north-south agreement. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea hopes that the South Korean authorities will rid themselves of their dependence on outside forces and respond positively to our proposal to exchange special envoys with a national independent position, in keeping with the requirements of the changing situation. In conclusion, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would like to point out that the United States of America recognized that a fundamental response should be sought to the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula and expressed its intention to seek a negotiated solution to the question. We regret, however, that the United States should have become a sponsor of the unjust draft resolution designed to put pressure on my country when it has made a political commitment to solve the issue through negotiations.

Allow me first, on behalf of the Government of my country, Slovakia, to give voice to our deep appreciation of the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General and for their consideration and assistance in the search for solutions to complex tasks in the field of nuclear safety within the framework of multilateral cooperation. Last year was one of great activity for the IAEA in the pursuit of one of its most important objectives, namely, the consequent enforcement of safety measures and strict control over potential violators of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We welcomed the third meeting of the Group of Experts preparing the nuclear safety agreement, which was held at Vienna in late January 1993, and the subsequent meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group at Lucerne in late March, which afforded opportunities for an exchange of notes with other members of the Group on the elaboration of guidelines to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and dual-use items. The subsequent acceptance of the Slovak Republic as a member of the Group and its membership in the Zangger Committee are further steps in our support of nuclear safety. In an era in which several States are striving to acquire nuclear arms and the materials for their production, thereby increasing the risk of creating a multitude of nuclear stockpiles, it is significant that the Slovak Republic has joined activities designed to counter such strivings. Our efforts aimed at more rigorous control over nuclear safety, at banning nuclear-weapon testing and at global coordination of cooperation to prevent irresponsible Powers from acquiring nuclear materials and arms have been met with full understanding and support at the highest levels of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I should like to urge all countries not yet signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, as well as those wishing to resign from membership or even calling for the Treaty’s cancellation, to reconsider their positions. The process of dissolution of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the resultant founding of two independent successor States, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, and the concomitant extinction of the original Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Committee, created the urgent need to establish independent State administrative bodies to ensure supervision of nuclear safety in both new countries in order to forestall the risk of losing control over the operation of nuclear-power establishments in the new States and their adherence to safety principles. That process has been completed in the Slovak Republic to the full satisfaction of international organizations We are determined fully to implement the measures required to ensure a stricter control over exports of nuclear materials and equipment, including dual-use items. We support the proposals to establish a global information system to report movements of nuclear materials and equipment. We highly value the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA and his team of inspectors assigned to inspect the Iraqi and North Korean nuclear establishments, as well as the actions that have resulted in the decisions of Argentina and the Republic of South Africa to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to adhere to the guidelines on the prohibition of exports of nuclear materials and dual-use items. We attribute no less importance to the issue of technical assistance and cooperation with the IAEA. We therefore regard the IAEA’s interest in implementing a model project of nuclear-safety inspection in Slovakia, reinforcing and developing the abilities of the State supervisory authority with regard to nuclear safety, as a signal honour for our country. Allow me to conclude my statement by expressing my country’s satisfaction at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report on its activities and our appreciation of the work of the Agency’s Director General, Mr. Hans Blix. We congratulate him on his reappointment to his high office, and we wish him and his colleagues all success in their continuing efforts and much energy and vigour in tackling further demanding tasks in the future.

Nuclear energy has proven to be an important factor in the solution of many of the global problems of our planet. I wish therefore to take this opportunity, on behalf of my country, to reiterate our support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its contribution to the peace, health and prosperity of the entire world. It is necessary to recognize the important contribution that IAEA technical assistance and cooperation represent to the developing countries. For Cuba in particular, in 1992 that cooperation meant the conclusion of important projects related to the application of nuclear technology to public health and radiological environmental monitoring. A striking example of the importance of such activities for Cuba is the rapid and timely assistance given by the IAEA, upon our request, in support of our struggle against the neuritis epidemic that has been affecting our population for some months. Among other issues to which the Agency devotes its attention, the convention on the safety of nuclear installations deserves special mention. My country feels that this convention, as its name indicates, will raise the level of nuclear safety at a global level and should cover all nuclear installations. We also believe that, in this framework, international cooperation and exchanges of technology should be promoted. At the same time, we are of the opinion that the convention should in no event limit the access of developing countries to technologies related to nuclear power and other peaceful applications of the atom, since it is precisely those countries that most need these technologies to resolve their serious socio-economic problems. My country also supports the work of the IAEA aimed at strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards regime. These should contribute to establishing a transparent atmosphere of international trust and should not be conceived as safeguarding the prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States. Measures adopted towards that end should be universal and non-discriminatory; there should also be an appropriate legal basis and a study of the technical, financial and political implications. In that context, we support the suggestion for the establishment of a safeguards committee open to the participation of all countries and similar to that established in the early 1970s on the non-proliferation Treaty. Lastly, Cuba encourages the Agency to continue to work to achieve optimal nuclear-safety levels and My country has followed attentively the course of events related to the implementation of the safeguards agreement signed between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Agency. We are convinced that the way to resolve this dispute is to pursue negotiations between the parties involved. It is therefore vital to avoid any action that could lead to stagnation in the negotiation process and thus exacerbate the already tense and dangerous situation in the region. We wish to reiterate here the position of principle that Cuba has consistently maintained regarding unconditional respect for the sovereignty of States and compliance with international agreements voluntarily undertaken, which are of a binding nature for all contracting parties. Finally, my delegation would like to express its appreciation for the efforts made by the Agency, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other countries in the search for a just and negotiated settlement of this dispute. At the same time, we express our hope that the needed steps will continue to be taken so that this important matter can be resolved successfully.

I should like to announce that the following States have become sponsors of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Add.1: Armenia, Dominica, Ethiopia, Latvia and Lithuania. We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for an explanation of vote before the voting. May I remind him that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea considers that there is no justification whatsoever for the inclusion of serious political elements, which have no legal basis, in draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, submitted with regard to the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which specializes in science and technology. The fact that the Board of Governors of the IAEA, meeting on 20 September, failed to reach a consensus on the draft resolution to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly concerning the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula, clearly shows this to be true. The attempt by the IAEA and some of its officials to adopt a resolution encroaching upon the sovereignty of a member State by abusing the name of the United Nations is a challenge to the negotiation process going on with a view to solving the issue. Some officials of the IAEA secretariat forced the meeting of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the IAEA to adopt the unjustified resolution, while closing their eyes to the proposals for negotiations put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In this connection, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has already categorically rejected the unjust resolution adopted at the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA. Accordingly, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot accept the ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1. The ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 7, which claim that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea "has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has ... widened the area of non-compliance" and refers to "implementation of the safeguards agreement", have no legal grounds. The joint statement of 11 June 1993 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America made a clear reference to the issue of impartial application of the safeguards agreement. It is clear to everyone that temporary suspension of the implementation of our announced withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not intended as acceptance of a partial inspection by the IAEA. In so unique a situation, the demand by the Agency to implement safeguards obligations is equivalent to the Agency’s enforcing a partial inspection on my country, and my delegation maintains that My delegation believes that pressure is not a way of solving the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. Encroaching upon the sovereignty of a party to the dialogue, and putting pressure on it, going against the trend of the current era to resolve all problems through dialogue and negotiations, can be interpreted only as a lack of will to resolve the issue. Adoption of a draft resolution aimed at interference in and pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not in line with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with international law and practice. The only answer for the just resolution of an issue is through dialogue and negotiations. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will continue to do its best to solve the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula through negotiations. For this reason, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea wishes to reiterate its total rejection of the ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/46/L.13 and Corr.1.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1. Separate votes have been requested on the eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs and on operative paragraphs 7 and 8 of the draft resolution. As there is no objection to these requests, I shall put these paragraphs to the vote first. I shall now put to the vote the eighth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

I now put to the vote the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A separate, recorded vote has been requested on operative paragraph 7.

A separate, recorded vote has been requested on operative paragraph 8.

I now put to the vote draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes. May I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

My delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1. The Philippines supports the programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Hence, it not only voted in favour of IAEA resolution GC (XXXVII/RES/624) of 1 October 1993, but was a co-sponsor of that resolution. The Philippines was prepared to be a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1 had suggestions from some delegations, including my own, been incorporated in the draft resolution to reflect greater consensus. Moreover, the draft resolution contains other elements not embodied in previous resolutions on the matter.

The delegation of Mexico voted in favour of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1 because we consider it of the utmost importance to support the work being done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We reaffirm our trust in that Agency’s role in the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As we all know, the General Assembly for many years adopted the resolutions on the reports on the IAEA’s work without a vote. My Government considers that the annual report submitted by the IAEA to the General Assembly should be confined, as had been the case until recently, to technical and procedural matters. The inclusion of political questions results, among other serious consequences, in the loss of consensus and a growing politicization of the subject, which benefits no one. We also believe that the resolution should not single out certain activities of the Agency, however important they may be, to the detriment of others. This type of selectivity alters the balance that should exist in the work of the Agency, and it acts to the detriment of the importance attached by the majority of Member States to activities aimed at promoting international cooperation in this field. In that connection, Mexico reaffirms the need to maintain balance between IAEA activities, in particular with respect to the application of safeguards, nuclear safety and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. I would note that on many occasions the Mexican Government has reiterated the importance of strengthening the Agency’s safeguards regime within a legal framework respecting the sovereignty of States. That is why we have proposed the establishment of an open-ended IAEA safeguards committee to enable Agency members to engage in ongoing in-depth study of the subject with a view to developing a universal, effective safeguards regime. The committee would need a well-defined mandate and a deadline for achieving its objectives.

The Chinese delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", and I wish to explain that abstention. First of all, let me say that our abstention implies no change in China’s view of the Agency. In its statement this morning, the Chinese delegation made a comprehensive positive appraisal of the Agency’s work over the past year. Thirdly, the Chinese delegation considers that the Assembly’s resolution on the report of the IAEA should not include specific issues relating to the work of the Agency, especially contentious issues such as the nuclear situation in Korea. That can only complicate the problems in question and is not conducive to a solution. In a constructive spirit, the Chinese delegation proposed a number of amendments to the draft resolution; unfortunately the sponsors of the text did not accept our well-intentioned suggestions. Fourthly, the Chinese delegation wants to reiterate China’s principled position on the nuclear issue in Korea. We support the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and do not favour the presence of any nuclear weapons in that peninsula. Now that the issue has developed into one involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the United States, the Republic of Korea and the IAEA, a fair, rational and comprehensive solution should be found through consultation and negotiation between those four parties, on the basis of equality and mutual respect. We welcome the holding of talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States, and hope they will lead to a solution. We believe that practices such as setting unreasonable preconditions, exerting pressure, issuing ultimatums and poisoning the atmosphere are not to be commended.

My delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, just adopted under agenda item 14, "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". As we pointed out during the debate on this item, the Cuban delegation attaches much importance, generally speaking, to the Agency’s work, which is, of course of great importance to developing countries. Because we are drawing up a balance sheet of the Agency’s activities over the past year, my delegation would have liked the draft resolution to be confined, as it was until two or three years ago, to a general assessment of the Agency’s work and hence to be adopted without the need for a vote. But to our regret this item has taken on a political cast; in my delegation’s view, this does not contribute to the attainment of the goal the Assembly should be pursuing with respect to this item. The draft resolution just adopted refers specifically to Security Council resolutions, for example resolution 687 (1991), which my delegation was unable to support for Moreover, the Cuban delegation has reservations about preambular and operative paragraphs that make a judgement about the activities of a State Member of the United Nations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and about its relationship with the IAEA. We think those matters should be considered solely by the competent IAEA bodies, not by the General Assembly, where we feel such consideration is out of place. In our view, this also contributes to creating further tension in the political climate in connection with this matter; hence we were unable to support the paragraphs in question. As we have already said, my delegation is convinced that the way to resolve this dispute is by continuing the negotiations between all the parties involved in this matter and that it is essential to avoid any action that could cause a deadlock in the negotiating process and exacerbate the already tense and dangerous situation in the region. It was for those reasons that my delegation was obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

My delegation abstained in the separate votes on the ninth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, which refer to compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, because we found those two paragraphs unbalanced. We believe that the sponsors of the text could have drafted those paragraphs in more positive language.

We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote. May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 14? COMMEMORATION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1995 COMMEMORATION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF THE FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY OF 30 OCTOBER 1943

This evening, in accordance with resolution 48/6 of 19 October 1993, the General Assembly is commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security of 30 October 1943. It will be recalled that on 30 October 1943 the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow issued the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, which recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

It gives me great pleasure to address the General Assembly on this important occasion, the fiftieth anniversary of the Moscow Conference of 1943. It was precisely half a century ago that the representatives of the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China adopted the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, in which, for the first time, the need was recognized for "the establishment at the earliest practicable date of a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security". It strikes me as profoundly symbolic that this first guidepost pointing the way to the establishment of the United Nations, one of whose main obligations is the maintenance of international peace and security, provided that historic path at the moment when the fronts of the Second World War were suffering their worst ravages. However, at that time, the leaders of the States that were present at the conception of the United Nations were already showing the way for the peoples of the world to ensure for themselves a safer and brighter future. The anniversary of the Moscow Conference is a symbolic one, owing to its humanistic dimension. The idea of international cooperation, brought to life at the height of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind, was given shape. People from all continents are drawn to this idea, and it is a source of inspiration for sculptors and poets, composers and scientists. The idea of humanism has become central in the activity of the United Nations. The Organization, which before had been held back by the constraints of the cold war that divided the world into two antagonistic camps, is now undergoing a revival. Only at the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of the triumph of democracy in Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe, did prospects open up for movement towards the world system that the founding fathers of the United Nations tried to create. However, new difficulties have been encountered along the way. We are witnessing a wave of aggressive nationalism and chauvinism and a struggle to revise borders, which could bring about new conflicts. Today, as never before, the peoples of the world have placed their most earnest hopes in the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. The success attained in this area - Namibia, Cambodia, and the settlement reached in Central America - is indisputable. At the same time, though, the limitations of these traditional approaches to settling conflicts are becoming more apparent. In the new conditions, it is most important to provide for operations to have clear political goals, strict control, efficient command and measures to protect civilians and United Nations personnel during conflicts. The possibility of a more active interaction of the United Nations with regional organizations deserves particular attention. Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States are counting on concrete support for their efforts to overcome crises throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. We and our neighbours, the Independent States, are addressing and will continue to address the United Nations with proposals for closer cooperation. We are convinced that there is no alternative to such cooperation. Today we face the task of adapting the United Nations to the world’s changing political landscape. Any measures taken should ensure increased practical results on the part of the United Nations in the fields of peace-keeping, protection of human rights, strengthening democratic institutions, The Moscow Declaration of 1943 solemnly proclaimed the need for joint action for the maintenance of peace and security. At the end of the twentieth century, the evolution of world events offers us a new, universal partnership based on a renewed United Nations. In attaining consensus on cardinal international issues, the members of the international community are called upon to make full use of the enormous potential of the United Nations. The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations should be a resounding confirmation of the importance of our Organization’s role in the life of the international community and should convincingly confirm the commitment of the States Members of the United Nations to the full realization of the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter half a century ago. We are prepared for comprehensive cooperation with other United Nations Members and all those that share the ideals of the Organization in attaining these noble and lofty goals.

As we begin our preparations for the upcoming celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995, we gather today in this Hall - two years in advance of that celebration - to commemorate an important event in the conception of our Organization. Fifty years ago this week the Governments of four wartime allies - the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and China - met in Moscow. At that meeting, those four Governments recognized the necessity for all peace-loving nations to enter into close collaboration with one another following the end of the Second World War. It was foreseen that only through this sort of close collaboration could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of the world’s peoples be fully promoted. As a result of this 1943 Moscow Conference, the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security was signed on October 30 of that year. The Declaration set forth the initial principles on which a broad system of international cooperation might be based. It advocated "establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." As we move through the preparatory phase of the celebration and commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, we should also remember the events leading up to its birth. Let us therefore all depart from today’s commemoration with renewed resolve in our individual and collective efforts to celebrate and publicize the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. At the same time, let us honour the memory of leaders in Moscow, at Dumbarton Oaks and in San Francisco by examining ways to strengthen and invigorate the Organization established in the interests of collective security and world peace. Sir David HANNAY (United Kingdom): In 1943, at the height of the Second World War, the leaders of the wartime alliance were turning their thoughts to peace. Their aim was to lay the foundations for an international organization which would be more effective than the League of Nations and which would be the guardian of international peace and security. Above all, it was to ensure that the nightmare of world war would never be repeated. The Moscow Conference in October 1943 saw the expression of these ideas. In the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, the Conference recognized the need to establish "a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." The Declaration was thus the beginning of the road which led to the establishment of the United Nations. It laid down a framework and some fundamental principles for the Organization which was to result. The birth took place almost exactly two years later in San Francisco. Fifty years on we pay tribute to the foresight and idealism which were reflected in that Declaration in Moscow. The subsequent history of the United Nations has of course not always been smooth. For much of the past 50 years the work of the Organization was hindered by the cold war. Only now is the United Nations able to operate in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security as the founding fathers intended, with the Security Council playing its role of leading the search for solutions to conflicts around the world. The United Kingdom is also committed, as we were in 1943, to ensuring that the architecture of international organizations fits the tasks with which they are charged. The United Nations must of course adapt over time to changes in the international situation. The increase in United Nations peace-keeping activities, for example, requires a corresponding adjustment in the structures which manage those operations. The United Kingdom has submitted ideas on this subject to the Secretary-General. We have also submitted our views on the composition of the Security Council, which the Assembly will shortly be discussing. This debate, too, is timely. As my Secretary of State said in the general debate on 29 September this year, we have no doubt that if there were to be consensus on enlargement of the Security Council, there are countries which by virtue of their global interests and contribution to international peace and security could undertake the full range of responsibilities of a permanent member and should certainly be expected to do so, alongside the current permanent members - the four signatories of the Moscow Declaration and France. In some areas the United Nations has successfully worked itself out of a job. The forthcoming referendum on Palau may remove the last territory from the administration of the Trusteeship Council. Some of the annual resolutions at the General Assembly will this year need to be adjusted to reflect the momentous changes in South Africa and the Middle East. We must be ready to adjust the United Nations when it has fulfilled its original function. Fifty years on from the Moscow Conference the United Nations has come a very long way. The membership has risen from the original 51 to 184. Seventeen new peace- keeping operations have been mandated in the last five years. The United Nations leads the way in fields as diverse as humanitarian assistance, sustainable development and helping to establish democracy through support for elections. The United Kingdom is both proud and privileged to have been among the nations represented in Moscow in 1943. In 1993 we continue to work for the success and effectiveness of an Organization which has grown to maturity over the last

It is of singular importance that we are gathered here today to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security. That Declaration played a positive role in bringing about the United Nations, and its elements relating to the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security remain relevant even today. The world has undergone tremendous changes since the inception of the United Nations. In recent years the world has moved into a period of transition towards multipolarity in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar structure. Indeed, there is now a better prospect of avoiding a new world war and ensuring lasting peace. But, at the same time, conflicts in the world are also on the rise, various contradictions are becoming more complicated, and the world situation remains turbulent. Peace and development, so ardently desired by the world’s people, still face grave challenges. Under these new circumstances, with higher expectations on the part of the world’s people, the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of world peace and the promotion of development is becoming increasingly important. The question of how the United Nations might better adapt to the changes in the world situation and play a more active role in world affairs has become an issue of universal concern. We hope the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security will help us explore the role of the United Nations and the arduous tasks confronting it, so as further to promote, strengthen and improve its work and enable it to handle major world affairs and defend and realize the purposes and principles of the Charter in a more active, balanced, just and effective manner in the new situation, thus contributing to the cause of maintaining

We have thus concluded the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security of 30 October 1943. May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 47?