A/RES/39/51 GA
Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
39
Session
139
Yes
0
No
8
Abstentions
| Draft symbol | A/RES/39/51 |
|---|---|
| Adopted symbol | A/RES/39/51 |
| Category | GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTORS |
| Voeten Topics ⓘ | |
| P5 Positions |
|
| UN Document | A/RES/39/51 ↗ |
Vote Recorded Vote — A/39/PV.97
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Afghanistan
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Algeria
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Angola
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Antigua and Barbuda
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Australia
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Austria
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Bahamas
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Bahrain
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Bangladesh
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Barbados
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Belgium
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Benin
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Bhutan
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Plurinational State of Bolivia
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Botswana
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Brazil
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Brunei Darussalam
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Bulgaria
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Burkina Faso
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Myanmar
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Burundi
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Belarus
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Cameroon
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Canada
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Central African Republic
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Chad
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Chile
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China
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Colombia
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Comoros
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Congo
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Costa Rica
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Cyprus
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Czechoslovakia
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Cambodia
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Democratic Yemen
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Denmark
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Dominican Republic
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Ecuador
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Egypt
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El Salvador
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Equatorial Guinea
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Ethiopia
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Fiji
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Finland
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Gabon
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German Democratic Republic
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Germany
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Ghana
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Greece
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Guatemala
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Guinea
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Guinea-Bissau
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Honduras
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Hungary
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Iceland
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India
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Indonesia
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Islamic Republic of Iran
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Iraq
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Ireland
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Israel
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Italy
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Jamaica
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Japan
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Jordan
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Kenya
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Kuwait
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Lao People's Democratic Republic
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Lebanon
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Lesotho
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Liberia
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Libya
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Luxembourg
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Madagascar
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Malaysia
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Maldives
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Malta
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Mauritania
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Mauritius
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Mexico
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Mongolia
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Morocco
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Mozambique
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Nepal
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Netherlands
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New Zealand
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Nicaragua
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Niger
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Nigeria
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Norway
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Oman
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Pakistan
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Panama
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Papua New Guinea
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Paraguay
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Peru
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Philippines
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Poland
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Portugal
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Qatar
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Romania
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Rwanda
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Saint Lucia
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Samoa
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Sao Tome and Principe
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Saudi Arabia
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Senegal
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Seychelles
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Sierra Leone
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Singapore
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Somalia
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Spain
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Sri Lanka
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Sudan
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Suriname
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Sweden
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Syrian Arab Republic
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Thailand
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Togo
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Trinidad and Tobago
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Tunisia
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Türkiye
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Uganda
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Ukraine
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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United Arab Emirates
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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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United Republic of Tanzania
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United States of America
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Uruguay
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Vanuatu
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Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
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Viet Nam
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Yemen
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Yugoslavia
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Democratic Republic of the Congo
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Zambia
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Zimbabwe
Full text of resolution
III. Resolutions adopted on the reports of the First Committee
57
Resolution
No.
Date of adopt/On
39/159
Inadmissibility of the policy of State terrorism and any actions by States aimed at
undermining the socio-political system in other sovereign States (A/391761) . .
143
I 7 December 1984
I 7 December 1984
99
99
39/160
Relationship between disarmament and development (A/391745).
55
39/51.
Implementation of General Assembly resolu
tion 38/61 concerning the signature and rati
fication of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
The General Assembly.
Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of S December
1967, 3262 (XXIX) of9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of
11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December I 977, S-10/2 of
30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11
December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of9
December 1981, 37/71 of9 December 1982 and 38/61 of
15 December 1983 concerning the signature and ratifica
tion of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibi
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco ), 2
Taking into account that within the zone of application
of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are
already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of
not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a
position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty
through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States
that de Jure or de facto are internationally responsible for
those territories may become parties,
Recalling that three of those States - the United King
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and the United States of America -
became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969, I 971 and
1981, respectively,
l. Deplores that the signature of Additional Protocol I
by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet
been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwith
standing the time already elapsed and the pressing invita
tions which the General Assembly has addressed to it;
2. Once more urges France not to delay any further
such ratification, which has been requested so many times
and which appears all the more advisable, since France is
the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is
open that is not yet party to it;
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its
fortieth session an item entitled "Implementation of Gen
eral Assembly resolution 39/5 l concerning the signature
and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco)".
97th plenary meeting
12 December 1984
39/52.
Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear
weapon tests, which has been examined for more than
twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has
adopted nearly fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the
2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.
3 Ibid., vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.
United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the
attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest
priority,
Stressing that on seven different occasions it has con
demned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since
1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of
nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus
increasing the danger of nuclear war,
Convinced that the existing means of verification are
adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear-test ban and
that the alleged absence of such means of verification is
nothing but an excuse for further development and refine
ment of nuclear weapons,
Reiterating the assertion made in several previous reso
lutions that, whatever may be the differences on the ques
tion of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying
the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test
ban,
Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has
declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the
problem have been so fully explored that only a political
decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agree
ment, that when the existing means of verification are
taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay
in achieving agreement on an underground-test ban, and
that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear
weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from
ending such tests,
Bearing in mind that the three nuclear-weapon States
which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water3 in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980
to the Committee on Disarmament, after four years of tri
lateral negotiations, stated, inter a/ia, that they were
"mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohi
bition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions in all environ
ments will have" as well as "conscious of the important
responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the
remaining problems", adding furthermore that they were
determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will
and persistence "to bring the negotiations to an early and
successful conclusion",4
Taking into account that the same three nuclear-weapon
States undertook twenty years ago, in the above-men
tioned Treaty, to seek the achievement of the discontinu
ance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time
and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in
1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera
tion of Nuclear Weapons,5 article VI of which further
embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to
take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
Bearing in mind the growing negative influence that the
total lack of compliance with those undertakings had on
both the first and the second Review Conferences of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
4 See CD/ 139/ Appendix 11/vol. II, document CD/ 130.
5 Resolution 23 73 (XXII), annex.
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